The return of the Good Neighbor: a policy for achieving U.S. objectives in Latin America through the nineties and beyond? by Jordan, Richard Leon
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1991-12
The return of the Good Neighbor: a policy for
achieving U.S. objectives in Latin America through
the nineties and beyond?
Jordan, Richard Leon
















THE RETURN OF THE "GOOD NEIGHBOR":
A POLICY FOR ACHIEVING U.S. OBJECTIVES





Thesis Advisor Scott D. Tollefson
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Inclassified )




1 b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
SECURITY CLASSIHCATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
DCLASSIHCATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a. NAME OFMONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
ADDRESS (city, stale, and ZIP code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000


















TITLE (Include Security Classification)
THE RETURNOF THE "GOOD NEIGHBOR": A POLICY FOR ACHIEVING U.S. OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA












The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government
COSATI CODES
FIELD GROUP SUBGROUP
18. SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
U.S. Policy, Latin America, National Security, Western Hemisphere.
ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis applies "Good Neighbor" policy principles developed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to U.S. interests
in Latin America today. Good Neighbor policy principles are identified and specific goals of the policy are analyzed. These
are compared to current U.S. security interests which are themselves analyzed in terms of their relevance to U.S. policy
towards Latin America in the 1990s. The international climate and issues of the early 20th century are compared to today's
issues and environment. It is determined that broad similarities do exist in terms of U.S. policy objectives. Specific
differences are also identified and the Good Neighbor policy principles are re-interpreted to account for these differences. Five
options for U.S. policy towards Latin America are discussed. The thesis concludes that a policy of cooperative multi-
lateralism, based on Good Neighbor principles, is the most effective policy for achieving U.S. objectives in Latin America.
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILrrY OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED JsAMEASRPT. JdTICUSERS
21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIHCATION
Unclassified
NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
Scott D. Tollefson




FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
SECURITY CLASSIHCATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
The Return of the "Good Neighbor"
:
A Policy For Achieving U.S. Objectives in




Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
BM & BMed, Lincoln University of Missouri, 1978
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
from the
ABSTRACT
This thesis applies the "Good Neighbor" policy principles
developed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to U.S.
interests in Latin America today. Good Neighbor policy
principles are identified and specific goals of the policy
are analyzed. These are compared to current U.S. security
interests which are themselves analyzed in terms of their
relevance to U.S. policy towards Latin America in the 1990s.
The international climate and issues of the early 20th
century are compared to today's issues and environment.
It is determined that broad similarities do exist in
terms of U.S. policy objectives. Specific differences are
also identified and the Good Neighbor policy principles are
re-interpreted to account for these differences.
Five options for U.S. policy towards Latin America are
discussed. The thesis concludes that a policy of
cooperative multi-lateralism, based on revised Good Neighbor
principles, is the most effective policy for achieving U.S.






II. THE ORIGINS OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY 5
A. 1907-1945: A WORLD IN SEARCH OF BALANCE 5
B. WHAT WAS THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY? 8
C. THE GOALS OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY 14
D. WAS THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY SUCCESSFUL? 2
E. THE END OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY 24
III. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 28
A. NEW PARADIGM, NEW THREATS? 2 8
1. "The Growing Role of Germany and Japan 3
2
.
"The Soviet Future" 34
3 . " Regional Trends
"
3 6
4. "Stemming Proliferation" 42
5. "Illicit Drugs" 44




8 "The Environment" 54
B. SUMMARIZING AND RATING THE ISSUES 57
IV. WOULD A REGIONAL POLICY BASED OF GOOD NEIGHBOR
PRINCIPLES ACHIEVE U.S. REGIONAL OBJECTIVES IN
TODAY' S WORLD? 61
A. A COMPARISON OF GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY OBJECTIVES








2 . The Sub-Regions 64
B. ARE U.S. INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF LATIN
AMERICA CONVERGING ? 65
C. THE GOOD NEIGHBOR PRINCIPLES REVISITED 7
1. The Creation and Maintenance of Cordial and
Intimate Relations Between the United States
and Other American Republics 70
2. The Principle of Continental Self -Defense




Consultation Between American Republics When
the Peace and Weil-Being of the American
World is in Question 80
4. The Acceptance of Pan-American Responsibilities
By All American Republics on Equal Terms,
and the Development of a Mechanism for Carrying
Out That Obligation 83
5. The Abolition of All Barriers and Restrictions
to Trade Between Nations of the Americas 87
D. PAIRING REVISED GOOD NEIGHBOR PRINCIPLES TO
SPECIFIC U.S. OBJECTIVES 89
V. CONCLUSION 92
A. U.S. REGIONAL POLICY OPTIONS 92
1 Benign Neglect 92
2 Pre-emptive Interventionism 96
3 Pure Pan-Americanism 96
4. U.S. Hegemony 98
5. Cooperative Multi-Lateralism 99
B. REGIONAL COOPERATION: A SHRINKING WINDOW
OF OPPORTUNITY 101




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 113
VI
I . INTRODUCTION
From the mid 1930s until the adoption of containment as
the guiding principle of U.S. security strategy in the late
1940s, the "Good Neighbor Policy" fostered an unprecedented
atmosphere of inter-American cooperation. Many Latin
American and North American scholars cite this period in
U.S. -Latin American relations as an era of positive inter-
action in an otherwise unproductive relationship.
Carlos Fuentes calls President Franklin Roosevelt's (FDR)
policies a "legacy of mutual and pragmatic respect." 1
Michael Kryzanek credits implementation of the Good Neighbor
policy with promoting substantial improvements in U.S. -Latin
American relations through wartime cooperation, expanded
trade, and post-World War II defense cooperation. 2 Richard
Bloomfield believes the time is right to develop U.S.- Latin
American collective security strategies similar to those of
the Good Neighbor policy. 3
1 Carlos Fuentes, Latin America: At War with the Past
(Toronto, Canada: CBC Enterprises, 1985), 55-6.
2 Michael J. Kryzanek, U.S. -Latin American Relations (New
York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 52-3.
3 Richard Bloomfield, "Suppressing the Interventionist
Impulse", in Richard Bloomfield and Gregory Treverton, ed.,
Alternative to Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), 93-136.
1
Others have advocated policies that mirror the principles
of the Good Neighbor policy even though they do not
explicitly link their recommendations to it. Abraham
Lowenthal calls for a U.S. policy built on "confidence and
trust" (confianza) with the United States and Latin America
confronting shared problems as partners. 4 Robert A. Pastor
discusses the opportunity to cement a "hemispheric bargain"
based on compromise and respect for both U.S. and Latin
American sovereignty. 5 George A. Fauriol contends we are in
a period of "unique historical context" in the Western
Hemisphere and the challenge is to "foster an affirmation of
hemispheric consensus and encourage countries to work toward
an often vaguely expressed partnership". 6 This partnership
would require a new mind set which Fauriol calls
"hemispheric regionalism". Over time, he asserts, this




4 Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict (Baltimore, MD:
The John Hopkins University Press, 1987) .
5 Robert A. Pastor, "Forging A Hemispheric Bargain: The
Bush Opportunity", in Journal of International Affairs , Vol.
43, No.l (Summer/Fall, 1989), 69-81.
6 Georges A. Fauriol, "The Third Century: U.S. Latin
American Policy Choices for the 1990s", CSIS Significant
Issues Series Vol.X, No. 13 (undated): xiii.
7 Ibid., 17.
2
The main question this thesis addresses is the following:
Could a rejuvenated version of the Good Neighbor policy be
an effective policy base for achieving U.S. objectives in
Latin America today and in the future? Related questions
include: What are the similarities and differences between
the forces shaping today's world and the forces that gave
birth to the Good Neighbor policy? What are the basic
principles of the Good Neighbor policy? Would such a
regional strategy be congruous with overall U.S. national
strategy? How would such a policy deal with the apparently
complex issues of inter-American concern? Are there other
regional policy options for the United States to pursue?
In order to answer these questions, Chapter II will
attempt to identify the forces at work in the 1930s and
1940s that led to the adoption of the Good Neighbor policy
by FDR and his administration. The fundamental principles
of Good Neighbor diplomacy will also be defined and
correlated with U.S. policy objectives during this era.
Chapter III will compare the forces that shaped the world
from World War I through World War II with today's
international environment. U.S. national security
objectives as stated in the President's National Security
Strategy of the United States 8 will be placed in a regional
perspective in order to identify those issues with relevance
to Latin America.
In Chapter IV, Good Neighbor issues and objectives will
be compared and contrasted with U.S. objectives in Latin
America today in an attempt to identify any similarities or
differences. Additionally, Good Neighbor principles will be
revised to try to determine whether or not they have any
application to present and future U.S. regional interests.
Chapter V will discuss five policy options that the
United States might use as the foundation for pursuing U.S.
interests in Latin America. In conclusion, it will
recommend the best path to pursue.
8 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States (August, 1991)
.
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY
An understanding of the international and U.S. domestic
environment that shaped the Good Neighbor policy is
important to determining its true objectives. This will
help place Good Neighbor policy in its proper perspective
and help in a determination of whether of not the policy was
successful
.
A. 1907-1945: A WORLD IN SEARCH OF BALANCE
The rise of Anglo-German antagonism at the turn of the
century, and the perceived threat this posed to Britain,
transformed the existing "Balance of Power" system in 1907.
This system had guided the actions of European powers for
almost a century. British fears were lodged in the belief
that Great Britain's own resources were no longer adequate
to maintain the security of its empire against a growing
German threat
.
This fear led to the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904
and the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. Examining these
agreements, and the alliances Germany had forged with
Austria and Italy, reveals that by 1907 a bi-polar system
had emerged between the two power camps. This system was
characterized by accelerating arms programs and the fear of
losing allies to the opposite camp. The lack of inter-
penetration between these camps and the inability of Britain
and Germany to control their junior partners made this an
unstable system that exploded in 1914. 9
After World War I, the failure of the victors to build an
effective international system led to over three decades of
instability and turmoil. The Balance of Power system had
been destroyed and the establishment of a new order between
1919 and 1939 became an impossible task for a number of
reasons. First, the number of nation-states with global
interests would grow steadily after World War I. Second,
British and French interests were often divergent, making
the process even more difficult. Third, the United States
emerged as a world power during the war but would withdraw
into isolationism in 1919 and abandon the leadership role it
had assumed. Fourth, political passion and divergent
ideologies were the order of the day. Communism was on the
rise in Russia while national socialism was taking root in
Germany. Additionally, nationalist sentiment in Japan was
major force helping to shape world events.
In the United States, emotional and mental isolation from
the problems in Europe and Asia permeated American politics.
9 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and
Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Times , 2nd ed. (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990), 40-3.
6
America's self-image and foreign policy were rooted in
isolationism nurtured by the geographic separation of the
United States from Europe's problems. 10 The United States
was still consciously seeking to rid itself of its European
heritage and detach itself from the problems of the rest of
the world. 11
This was the domestic environment that FDR faced as
President through the 1930s. Though not an isolationist, he
too had a desire to keep the United States from becoming
directly involved in European wars. However, he recognized
the nature of the forces at work in the world and came to
10 Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations:
Frameworks for Understanding , 2nd ed. (New York, NY: MacMillan
Publishing Co. , 1988), 170-4.
11 George Washington set the stage for American foreign
policy that essentially remained unchanged until World War II.
In his farewell address he stated n Europe has a set of
primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote
relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent
controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to
our concerns.... Our detached and distant situation invites
and enables us to pursue a different course Why forego the
advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to
stand upon foreign ground? Why, by intertwining our destiny
with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and
prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship,
interest, humour, or caprice"? Ralph K. Andrist, ed., "George
Washington: A Biography in His Own Words", as quoted by Daniel
S . Papp , Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for
Understanding , 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing
Co., 1988), 171.
the realization that the survival of the United States was
linked to the outcome of events unfolding on the world
stage. FDR would eventually link the survival of the United
States to the survival of Britain and the destruction of the
German war machine. 12
B. WHAT WAS THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY?
The Good Neighbor policy was part of FDR's strategy for
preventing Germany from establishing a strong-hold in Latin
America. It represented a pragmatic approach towards
achieving regional stability in a generally unstable world.
It evolved from policy initiatives outlined during the
Hoover administration, FDR's own life experiences, and the
12 A speech given by Roosevelt on August 14, 1936 at
Chautauqua, New York indicates his thinking on U.S.
involvement in the war. He states "...we are not
isolationists except insofar as we seek to isolate ourselves
from war. Yet we must remember that so long as war exists on
earth there will be some danger even to the nation that most
ardently desires peace, danger that it also may be drawn into
war I have passed unnumbered hours and I shall pass
unnumbered hours thinking and planning how war may be kept
from the United States of America...." Edgar B. Nixon, ed.,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs , Vol. Ill (Cambridge,
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1969), 378. For
a more thorough analysis of FDR's war policies see Ted Morgan,
FDR: A Biography (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1985) .
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influence exerted by a handful of his close advisors. 13
FDR did not always subscribe to such a cooperative
doctrine. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy during Woodrow
Wilson's presidency, he asserted that U.S. assurances of
stability in the Americas were essential for trade and
commerce, particularly in the Caribbean region. He
commended Wilson for landing marines at Vera Cruz in 1914
and supported intervention in Haiti in 1915. Reacting to
what he perceived as German encroachment in the Caribbean in
1917, FDR promoted the idea of the United States restoring
order where necessary and maintaining U.S. military presence
in the region. 14
However, FDR's views changed considerably in the 1920s.
In a 1928 article entitled "Our Foreign Policy" published in
Foreign Affairs , he interpreted the self-defense principle
of the Monroe Doctrine as a cooperative effort. He
concluded that whenever U.S military force is used in Latin
America, it should be in conjunction with other Latin
13 President Hoover never defined his Latin American
policy as clearly as F. Roosevelt would, but he reversed the
interventionist tendencies of previous presidents and
repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International System
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 120.
14 Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Policy: United States
Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945 (Baltimore MD: The John
Hopkins University Press), 10-1.
American nations. 15 What caused this change in
perspective? For one, his personal fight against polio had a
transforming effect on FDR's basic character. 16 Another
factor was his association in the early 1920s with the
Sumner Welles, a man FDR would pick as his Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.
Welles had the same educational background as FDR and
they moved within the same social circles. As a result,
they had common friends and acquaintances. Eleanor
Roosevelt's mother and Welles' mother were close friends.
Welles' and Eleanor Roosevelt's brother were classmates at
Harvard. 17 The social connection is important in that it
provided opportunities for Welles and Roosevelt to discuss




16 Though he never won the physical battle, FDR triumphed
in the mental war against polio. A new FDR emerged. He became
more patient, mature, and reflective. His experience with
polio was the first time in his life that he personally felt
the pain of suffering. Additionally, FDR developed a more
critical sense of timing in his approach to both domestic and
foreign policy. For a more in depth study of FDR's
personality see Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York, NY:
Simon & Schuster, 1985) .
17 Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United
States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945 (Baltimore MD: The
John Hopkins University Press, 1979), 13.
10
Welles had been directly involved in Latin America as the
head of several presidential missions to the Caribbean to
defuse volatile situations. This increased his stature as
an expert in U.S. - Latin American relations. Though he
left public service in 1925, he remained a student and
scholar of Latin American affairs in private life. It is
interesting to note that in 1927, one year before
Roosevelt's Foreign Affairs article, Welles wrote a history
of the Dominican Republic entitled Naboth's Vineyard. In
this book, he praised Secretary of State Hughs for
interpreting the Monroe Doctrine as a defensive rather than
offensive doctrine. 18
When compared to Welles' belief that U.S. military force
should be used only after consulting other American nations,
and his ideas of hemispheric political and economic
cooperation, his influence on FDR's Latin American policies
appear significant. 19 This influence is even more apparent
18 Ibid., 14.
19 One quote from Naboth's Vineyard is evidence that
Welles' ideas may have influenced FDR's vision of the "wholly
new attitude" towards Latin America. In summing up his ideas
on what U.S. policy towards the region should be in the
future, Welles states that "... in the Western Hemisphere lies
its [U.S.] strength and support. In the identification of its
interest both political and material, on a basis of absolute
equality, with the interests of its sister republics of the
continent, and in the rapid removal of the grounds for their
11
in a letter to FDR prior to his inauguration in 1933. In
this letter, Welles explicitly outlined his views on
hemispheric solidarity to the new president. The following
is a summary of the principles he espoused:
- The creation and maintenance of cordial and intimate
relations between the U.S. and other American Republics.
- The principle of continental self-defense and the
adoption of this principle by all American Republics.
- The principle of consultation between American Republics
when the peace and well being of the American world is
in question.
- The acceptance of Pan-American responsibilities by all
republics on equal terms, and the development of a
mechanism for carrying out that obligation.
- The abolition of all barriers and restrictions to trade
between nations of the Americas. 20
In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, FDR
generalized the broad concept of what would become the Good
Neighbor policy. 21 In an address before the pan-American
distrust, lies its [U.S.] real advantage". Ibid.
20 The principles are not explicitly listed in Welles'
letter to Roosevelt. The list represents an interpretation of
his views extracted from the text of the letter as published
in Edgar B. Nixon, ed., "Draft by Sumner Welles of a statement
on Pan-American Policy", Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign
Affairs , Vol.1 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1969), 18-9.
21 Roosevelt's brief but often quoted passage from the
inaugural address reads "....In the field of world policy I
would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the Good Neighbor-
the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he
12
Union approximately one month later, he restated in his own
words most of the principles forwarded by Welles. These




does so, respects the rights of others-the neighbor who
respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his
agreements in and with a world of neighbors. We now realize
as we have never realized before our interdependence on each
other; that we cannot merely take, but must give as well..."
James W. Gantenbein, ed., "Inaugural address by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 4, 1933 (extract)", The Evolution
of Our Latin-American Policy: A Documentary Record (New York,
NY: Octagon Books, 1971), 159.
22 The following are selected extracts from Roosevelt's
address to the Pan American Union: (1) On cooperation and
responsibility, "....Friendship among nations, as among
individuals, calls for constructive efforts mutual
obligations and responsibilities" a sympathetic
appreciation of the other's point of view", (2) On the Monroe
Doctrine, " it was directed at the maintenance of the
independence by the people of the continent"., and it is
referred to as "...this Pan American doctrine of continental
self-defense", (3) On equality, " .... Your Americanism and
mine must be cemented by a sympathy which recognizes only
fraternity and equality", (4) On trade, "....the American
governments individually (should) ... .take action as may be
possible to abolish all unnecessary and artificial barriers to
trade." James W. Gantenbein, ed., "Address by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Delivered before the Governing Board of
the Pan American Union, at Washington, April 12, 1933", The
Evolution of Our Latin American Policy: A Documentary Record
(New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1969), 159.
13
C. THE GOALS OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY
FDR was gravely concerned over the prospects for global
instability as a consequence of war. 23 Irwin F. Gellman
states that "Roosevelt alone saw the totality of domestic
and foreign interaction. From that vantage point, he
realized his Latin American opportunity" and that Latin
America would play "an integral part in shaping worldwide
strategy" , 24
FDR viewed the war in Europe as a direct threat to the
security of the United States and moved to neutralize the
influence of Germany in the Western Hemisphere. Latin
American nations were among the leading exporters of all but
two of the ten most important strategic raw materials of the
time. This made it important to deny Germany access to
23 Some of the most profound statements made by Roosevelt
on his concerns over stability are those made in a speech at
the San Diego Exposition in 1935. He states " the
greatest writer in our history described the two most menacing
clouds that hang over human government and human society as
'malice domestic and foreign war.' Never was there more
genuine reason for Americans to face down these two causes of
fear." Edgar B. Nixon, ed., "Speech by Roosevelt at the San
Diego Exposition, San Diego, California, Oct. 2, 1935",
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs , Vol. Ill (Cambridge:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), 12-3.
24 Ibid.
14
these resources. 25 Latin America also accounted for
virtually 100 percent of U.S. oil imports and U.S. oil
companies were heavily involved throughout the
hemisphere. 26 Additionally, the Panama Canal and the
Caribbean basin were vital sea lines of communication for
both trade and the Allied war effort.
FDR knew Germany had territorial designs on Latin
America. Germany's desire was based partly on the general
principle of territorial expansion inherent in German
national socialist philosophy. But the primary motivation
was Latin America's significance as a source of raw
materials for Germany's economic growth. 27 FDR understood
the severe consequences for the Allied war effort if Germany
25 The ten raw materials were chromate, copper, lead,
manganese, petroleum, tin, zinc, iron ore, coal, and nickel.
The last two were not exported by Latin America. Lars
Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward
Latin America
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 158.
26 Ibid., 155.
27 In an journal article for Foreign Affairs written in
1937 entitled "Germany's Colonial Demands", a well known
German economist Hjalmar Schacht wrote. . "Germany must produce
her raw materials on territory under her own management".
Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy
toward Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1987), 157.
15
gained a strong foothold in the region. 28 His
administration made a conscious and deliberate effort to
counter German influence in South America and keep it from
spreading elsewhere in hemisphere.
Towards this end, the primary objective of FDR's strategy
appears to have been a commitment from Latin countries to
anti-Axis security policies through cooperative security
arrangements. The first, second, third, and fourth
principles of the Good Neighbor policy relate directly to
this effort.
FDR's efforts paid off with the adoption of the Act of
Havana in 1940 when Latin countries committed themselves to
protect the territorial possessions of non-American States
threatened by force. Later, at the Rio Conference in 1942,
Latin countries agreed to sever commercial ties with the
Axis powers and committed themselves to a war effort in
support of the Allies. The Rio Conference also established
the Inter-American Defense Board for hemispheric defense
cooperation and resulted in many bilateral defense
28 In a memorandum of conversation dated April 11, 193 9,
between Secretary of State Hull and the Bolivian Minister to
the United States, Hull speaks to the need for the United
States to contain "lawless nations, hungry as wolves for the
vast territory with rich undeveloped natural resources such as
South America possesses". Ibid., 157.
16
agreements between the U.S. and Latin countries. 29
Growing nationalism was a primary force in Latin America
that threatened attainment of this objective. This force
exacerbated the issues of national sovereignty and economic
fairness which were major issues involved in the
expropriation of U.S. oil company property in Bolivia (1937)
and Mexico (1948) . In the Mexican case, the oil companies
and their supporters appealed to FDR for U.S. military
intervention. 30 However, the administration held to its
commitments of hemispheric solidarity and legal settlements
in both these cases were reached. 31 If FDR had intervened
militarily on behalf of U.S. oil interests, it is doubtful
the U.S. would have retained its credibility in the region
or achieved regional cooperation in the war effort.
Neutralizing nationalist sentiment in Latin America appears
to have been another goal of FDR's strategy to draw the
United States and Latin America closer together. This
objective correlates to the first principle of the Good
29 Ibid., 54-5.
30 The most significant case of expropriation was the
Mexican Governments seizure of U.S. oil company properties in
1938. Michael Kryzanek, U.S. -Latin American Relations (New
York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 53.
31 Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United
States Policies in Latin America 1933-1945 (Baltimore, MD: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 56.
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Neighbor policy. Striving for this goal helped counter
German influence in South America. As a consequence, the
second principle of the Good Neighbor policy was also
served.
From the beginning, non-intervention was a useful
strategy that became an integral part of Good Neighbor
diplomacy. The United States refused to intervene in
Nicaragua to counter Somoza's growing power which culminated
in the ouster of President Sacasa in 1936. 32 Further proof
of a U.S. commitment to non-intervention came in 1937 when
the United States refused to intervene and settle a border
dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras that threatened war
between the two states. Instead, the dispute was settled
through mediation efforts.
Many circumstances presented opportunities for the United
States to fall back on military intervention to secure its
objectives in the Caribbean. Each time, the United States
used diplomacy instead of intervention as the means of
resolution. 33 However, a principal reason intervention was
abandoned by FDR was because it could not achieve his
primary objective of hemispheric solidarity as a counter the
German threat. There was no desire to turn nationalist
32 Ibid. , 31-2.
33 Ibid., 33-8.
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sentiment against the United States and intervention would
have been counter-productive. In this respect, non-
intervention was more a diplomatic strategy rather than a
firm and unwavering commitment by the United States. 34
America's recovery from the depression was also a factor
in FDR's Latin American equation. In speeches, he touted
Latin America as a source of new markets for the United
States and as means of fostering closer ties.
Latin America was also searching for ways to recover
from economic depression. As a result, many reciprocal
trade agreements between the United States and 15 Latin
countries were negotiated during this time. 35 However,
U.S. trade policy lacked clear direction and conflicts
between protectionists and advocates of trade expansion went
unresolved. 36 As a result, few economic gains for either
the United States or Latin America were realized from these
34
"Non-intervention was never an absolute reality-only
an illusion that was valuable in popularizing the Good
Neighbor principle." Ibid., 39.
35 These trade agreements were signed from 1933 through
1945. Eleven of these were signed before 1940. Irwin Gellman
offers a brief but interesting analysis of six of these
agreements involving Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, Cuba,
Colombia, and Venezuela. Ibid., 48.
36 Ibid., 40.
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agreements. 37 Nevertheless, expanded trade remained an
important element of the Good Neighbor policy as implied in
the first principle and specified in the fifth principle.
D. WAS THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY SUCCESSFUL?
Table 1 is a graphic representation of the analysis
above. Each Good Neighbor policy objective is rated from
very high to very low in terms of its relevance to the sub-
regions identified. A subjective evaluation of each
objective's importance to the success of the Good Neighbor
policy is provided. Each sub-region is also given an
overall rating based on the total relevance of each
objective in that sub-region. This is a subjective
evaluation of the sub-region's relative importance to
achieving the regional goals of the Good Neighbor policy.
At this point, emphasis will be placed on determining the
importance of each issue in order to make a determination as
to the success or failure of the Good Neighbor policy. The
relevance of the vertical summation and each sub-region's
37 U.S. exports to Latin America rose an average of 1.7
percent from 1936 to 1939 while imports rose .7 percent.
Latin American exports to the United States for the same
period rose 4.6 percent while imports rose 7.7 percent,
reflecting the loss of European trade as the result of war.
The problems with U.S. foreign economic policy at the time
stemmed in large part from the internal rivalry between
Secretary of State Hull and Welles on this and other issues.
Ibid., 58.
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overall rating will be analyzed and discussed in
Chapter III.
A horizontal evaluation of each issue indicates that
security cooperation and countering German influence in
Latin America was the primary goal of the Good Neighbor
policy. Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean were
rated "very high" for this issue due to the emphasis Good
Neighbor policy diplomacy placed on hemispheric solidarity
and the strategic significance of the Mexican oil, the
Panama Canal, and Caribbean trade routes. Brazil, the
Southern Cone, and the Andean sub-regions were rated "very
high" not only due to their strategic significance in terms
of raw materials, but also due to the concern over German
influence.
The issue of nationalism in Latin America ties with
expanded free trade in overall significance with an overall
rating of "high to very high". Mexico, Brazil, the Southern
Cone, and Andean sub-regions ratings of "very high" are due
primarily to U.S. concerns over the expropriation of U.S.
private property, particularly U.S. oil company holdings.
The overall rating of "high to very high" for expanded
free trade is based upon the significance of each sub-region
to the U.S. economy and the potential for expanded trade.
This includes involvement by U.S. businesses, especially oil
companies, and the bilateral trade agreements that
21
resulted from Good Neighbor diplomacy. From a somewhat
different perspective, security cooperation and countering
German influence could be tied to the issue of nationalism
under one major category called U.S. security concerns. In
this analysis, two broad categories of issues become evident
- U.S. security concerns and regional economic priorities.
TABLE 1. SPECIFIC AND OVERALL RATINGS FOR LATIN AMERICAN
SUB-REGIONS AND U.S. ISSUES AND INTERESTS DURING


















































































* This rating is due to Cuba's economic and political
significance to the United States during the Good Neighbor
era.
By linking these broad categories with specific Good
Neighbor policy principles (GNPP) the correlations in Table
22
2 are evident. This perspective supports the contention that
realizing U.S. security objectives was the primary goal of
the Good Neighbor diplomacy. Four Good Neighbor policy
principles relate directly to this issue.
TABLE 2. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY














1, 2, 3, & 5
As a result of their successful application, nationalist
sentiment in Latin America was neutralized by relying on
diplomatic solutions to disputes rather than intervention.
This approach made Latin American nations more receptive to
U.S. proposals for security cooperation. Inter-American
security cooperation was achieved and German influence in
the Western Hemisphere was effectively countered.
Although expanded trade never fulfilled the hopes of some
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in FDR's administration, the trade agreements that where
signed did indirectly support the principle of hemispheric
solidarity and moved the United States and Latin America
closer together. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude
that the Good Neighbor policy achieved most of its
objectives including the most significant one.
The Good Neighbor policy secured vital U.S. interests
while at the same time fostered an atmosphere of trust and
cooperation between the United States and Latin America.
The essence of the Good Neighbor policy principles were
codified in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (Rio Treaty) in 1947 and the Charter of the
Organization of American States (OAS)in 1948. 38 The broad
mandates for inter-American cooperation outlined in these
documents, and the mechanisms developed for their
implementation, owe their beginnings to FDR and his
administration
.
E. THE END OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY
If the Good Neighbor policy was successful, why did it
fade after World War II? The answer lies in the nature of
the international system that would emerge after the war.
A tight, bipolar system emerged that pitted the United




client states. Communism was identified as the primary
threat to U.S. national security. It represented the
antithesis of American democratic values and containing its
spread became the U.S. imperative. The strategy of
containment was implemented for this purpose. 39
International relations were dominated by the ideological
conflict between East and West. In the aftermath of World
War II, the United States emerged as the only western power
capable of meeting this threat. This global security
responsibility left little room for diplomatic maneuvering
or compromise on the part of U.S. policy-makers. Therefore,
they embraced the strategy of containment as the best
solution to the unique dilemmas they faced.
Bryce Wood argues that the cooperative security
arrangements between the United States and Latin America
created by Good Neighbor diplomacy might have proved
successful in countering the communist challenge in the
39 NSC 68 and its endorsement of a perimeter defense
strategy represented a departure from the concept of
containment originally outlined by George F. Kennan. His
policy recommendations were based on economic assistance to
Europe and Asia for the purpose of reversing the "profound
exhaustion of physical plant and of spiritual vigor" as the
result of World War II, and restoring a balance of power.
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical
Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 36-91.
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western hemisphere if given the chance. 40 He contends the
dismantling of the Good Neighbor policy by the U.S. began in
1954 when the Eisenhower administration decided to side-step
the OAS and intervene in Guatemala. 41 He goes on to argue
that the United States should have consulted with the other
American States using the procedures set forth in the OAS
charter. In his view, this might have resulted in some
action to meet the perceived threat to U.S. security without
the need for unilateral intervention. 42
Woods' opinion, however, neglects the importance of NSC-
68 in guiding U.S. policy decisions and its enormous
implications for U.S. actions in the world. NSC-68 stated
the Soviet Union was out to demonstrate that only the
Kremlin had the will to use force and that those not willing
to use force to achieve their goals were doomed. Therefore,
perceptions of the balance of power became just as important
as the actual balance itself in maintaining world order and
U.S. security. 43
40 Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), 197-8.
41 Ibid., 204-5.
42 Ibid., 206.
43 John 1. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (London,
England: Oxford University Press, 1982), 92.
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NSC-68 also defined any extension of Soviet domination as
an increase in their power. This made any Soviet advances
along the "perimeter" of equal importance. 44 Military
confrontation became the predominant element of power in the
new order and the developing nations became the battlefield
of the Cold War. The battle in the Western Hemisphere
expanded and military intervention regained its position as
an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in the region.
Bryce Wood states that the "dismantling" of the Good
Neighbor policy, which began with the Guatemalan
intervention in 1954, was completed by the Carter
administrations purposeful adoption of a bilateral approach
in its relations with Latin countries. 45 Throughout this
period, and continuing to the end of the Cold War in 1989,
the cooperative security arrangements created by Good
Neighbor diplomacy remained incongruous with the expedient
priorities of U.S. national security and U.S.
responsibilities as the leader of the western world.
44Ibid., 91.
45 Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), 208-9.
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III. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
The bi-polar system that maintained equilibrium during
the Cold War no longer exists and power is being diffused at
an accelerated pace. The world is in a period of
transition. In the United States, there are calls from neo-
isolationists for the United States to withdrawal from the
world stage and adopt policies to insulate the United States
from foreign influence.
In this changed environment, what are the interests of
the United States? How do these interests translate into
issues that can be related to U.S. objectives in Latin
America?
A. NEW PARADIGM, NEW THREATS?
In many respects, the world today resembles the world of
the period between World War I and World War II.
Instability is the natural result of the turbulence caused
by transition. President George Bush and his administration
draw parallels between the forces of isolationism that exist
in the United States today and the domestic mood in the
1920s. 46 A number of alternative futures seem possible
46 The White House, National Security Strategy of the U.S.
(August, 1991), 2.
28
depending on the choices of today's leaders and their
ability to mobilize resources, individually or collectively,
to achieve their objectives.
On the economic front, the world appears to be moving
toward a system balanced between regional trade blocs, each
dominated by a major economy (United States in the Americas,
Germany in the EEC, and Japan in Asia) . Whether the
interactions between these blocs will be peaceful or
antagonistic has yet to be determined.
On the political front, the United States has emerged as
the pivotal actor in world events, at least for the moment.
Administration policy implies a determined effort to keep
the United States in the forefront and "not to retreat from
the world's problems". 47 In this effort, U.S. leadership
is considered "pivotal and inescapable"
.
48 However, the
administration's strategy calls for reliance on alliances,
international organizations, and cooperative security
arrangements as the primary means of ensuring world
stability. 49
The National Security Strategy of the United States





States will have to confront in the pursuit of its
interests. Those applicable to Latin America are discussed
in the following sub-sections. 50
1. "The Growing Role of Germany and Japan"
As in the 192 0s and 193 0s, Germany and Japan have
again emerged as primary players on the world stage.
Administration policy-makers call this "one of the most
important and far-reaching strategic developments of a new
era" . 51
Germany and Japan will play major parts in shaping
the new world order as the economic front-runners in the
European Economic Community (EEC) and Asia. U.S. policy
supports this development. However, it also recognizes the
fact that the United States, Germany, and Japan have
occasionally been bitter competitors in the economic
arena. 52 Complete integration of the EEC will represent a




53 Some of the technical obstacles include opposition to
the elimination of frontier controls, harmonization of
indirect taxes and national tax systems, and reaching a
consensus on the liberalization of capital movements and
reciprocity in international banking practices. Gita Bhatt,
"Europe 1992: The Quest for Economic Integration" , in Finance
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Asian trade bloc consisting of Japan, the Republic of Korea,
China, Singapore, and Taiwan could also be established. 54
The combined output of these countries already threatens to
exceed U.S. output. 55 These developments could result in a
shift in the balance of economic power. Additionally,
competition between old allies on the economic front could
create a hostile economic environment on a global scale.
Abraham F. Lowenthal claims Latin America may gain
new importance to the United States as an export market due
to demographics and the prospects for economic growth in the
region which "translates more directly into U.S. exports
than in the case of other regions". 56 This idea builds on
upon his concept of linking overall U.S. hemispheric policy
to the economic recovery of the United States. In his view,
and Development (June 1989): 40-2.
54 Many economists believe trading blocs are the way of
the future. Hang-Sheng Cheng, Vice President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco (FRBSF) points to two recent
developments that suggest trade regionalism is on the rise.
First, the decision by the EEC to achieve full integration by
1992. Second, The conclusion of the free trade agreement
between the U.S. and Canada in 1988. Hang-Sheng Cheng,
"Toward Trade Blocs?", FRBSF Weekly Letter (5 August, 1988).
55 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States (March, 1990): 6.
56 Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict (Baltimore, MD:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
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this is the best way to spur hemispheric economic growth. 57
Lowenthal also points out the need to gain the backing of
U.S. domestic groups such as labor unions, banks, human
rights groups, Latino communities, and religious groups for
a program designed to promote overall hemispheric
cooperation. 58
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI)
could be the first step towards filling Lowenthal 's
prescription. Latin America is reacting favorably to this
initiative which includes multi-lateral free trade
agreements, a hemispheric free trade zone, investment funds
for Latin American economic reform and development, and
creative debt reduction schemes that include "debt for
nature" swaps. 59
Whether free trade area encompassing the entire
Western Hemisphere is ever realized is not the most
important issue. The broad vision of the initiative has
already generated positive results. Many Latin American
countries are pursuing free trade and investment framework
agreements with the United States as the first step in the
57 Ibid., 197.
58 Ibid., 198.
59 Ron Scherer, "Latin Plan Launches New Partnership, " The
Christian Science Monitor (3 July, 1990): 4. "Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative," GIST
, (21 September): 1990.
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process towards free trade agreements. Negotiations are
underway on a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
between Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. If it becomes a
reality, the NAFTA would likely be the baseline for similar
agreements between the United States and Latin countries. 60
Latin Americans themselves are also moving forward with
the creation and re-vitalization of sub-regional integration
schemes and bilateral agreements. 61 One of the purposes of
these arrangements may be to bring collective leverage to
bear on the United States in future trade negotiations.
Nevertheless, these actions promote interdependence and
60 See Ron Scherer, "Latin Plan Launches New Partnership",
reported in The Christian Science Monitor ( 3 July, 1990) : 4.
61 The following are some of the ongoing initiatives; the
U.S. and Canada are working with Mexico to secure a free trade
agreement this year; Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua signed a complimentary
economic agreement to work towards a free trade zone in 1996,
"Calderon on Free Trade, Oil," (in Spanish) , translated and
reported in FBIS LAT-91-009 (14 January 1991), 1. The Andean
Bloc nations have also begun free trade talks. Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay have plans for a common market
by 1995. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador , Chile, Honduras, and
Costa Rica have signed bilateral framework agreements with the
U.S. to implement initiatives under the "Enterprise for the
Americas" initiative, and Venezuela and Peru are working on
similar agreements with the United States, Richard C.
Schroder, " A Languid Pursuit of Free Trade", reported in
Times of the Americas , (January, 1991) . Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay have completed a framework agreement
with the United States.
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cooperation at the sub-regional level which, in turn,
enhance the chances for achieving hemispheric free trade.
Latin Americans realize the world is moving towards
free market economics. This is a positive development for
the United States as long as Latin Americans continue to
link their economic future with the United States. The
failure to successfully negotiate and approve the NAFTA
could prove disastrous for other free trade agreements and
the broad objectives of the EAI . It could also send a
signal to the rest of Latin America that their economic
future lies elsewhere. In the short term, the impact on the
United States would likely be minimal. However, over the
long-term, such a development could strip the United States
of a significant portion of its economic might vis-a-vise
the EEC (led by Germany) and the Asian bloc (led by Japan)
.
2. "The Soviet Future"
Severe economic conditions in the Soviet Union have
forced a strategic retreat on the international front. This
has created a power vacuum to will be filled by others. In
Eastern Europe, the end of Soviet domination has resulted in
the re-unification of Germany. Soviet weakness and the
rekindled fires of nationalism sustained the drive for
independence and autonomy in the Baltics. These same forces
are still a factor in the push for autonomy by the various
Soviet republics.
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In effect, a "fundamental transformation" is underway
in the Soviet Union as well as the rest of the world. 62
This change has reduced the primacy of ideology in Soviet
foreign affairs. 63 However, Soviet military strength is
still considered a potential threat in single flank or
regional scenarios. 64
In the western hemisphere, political liberalization
and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union has led to the rise
of more democratic forms of government. This trend provides
the opportunity to secure one of the most fundamental pan-
American interests - to create an environment of hemispheric
solidarity strong enough to counter the establishment of
"the hostile foreign ideological base" and make the Americas
safe for democracy . es
In the future, the most significant threat to the
goal of securing democracy will likely be similar to those
the United States faced in the 1930s. Fascism took root in
South America because it offered the promise of recovery
62 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States (August, 1991), 5.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Hayes, Margaret Daly, "U.S. Security Interests in
Central America", in Contadora and the Diplomacy of Peace in
Central America , Vol. 1 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987),
5.
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from the severe economic depression. If democracy does not
fulfill the political, social, and economic expectations of
Latin Americans today, it seems plausible that the ultra-
nationalistic sentiment evident in other parts of the world
could take seed in Latin America sparking a new round of
authoritarianism.
3. "Regional Trends"
The power vacuum created by the end of the Cold War
paradigm has created an environment where regional conflicts
may escalate. These conflicts could severely hamper any
attempt to achieve a peaceful world order and lead to a
prolonged state of instability similar to the period from
World War I through World War II. Such an environment would
increase the possibility that radical ideologies and
authoritarianism will re-emerge. As a result, U.S. security
strategy is putting more emphasis on responses to regional
conflicts to meet this threat. 66
The end of the bi-polar power system and its
relative stability has unleashed old rivalries and tensions
previously suppressed. The August 1990 invasion of Kuwait
by Iraq and the current civil war in Yugoslavia are two
66 As discussed in a presentation entitled "Evolution of
the National Military Strategy" , during the 1991 Fleet CINC
Planners' Conference at the Naval Post Graduate School (5-7
March, 1991) .
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examples of these forces in action.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union has created
its own set of problems. The Ukraine has declared
independence from the Russian Republic and the central
government. The more ethnic republics have also claimed
their independence and strong nationalistic sentiment rooted
in ethnicity has many of these republics on the brink of
civil war.
In South Asia, Indo-Pakistani tensions still run
high. If a major military confrontation erupted between
these two nations, the possibility that nuclear weapons
would be used cannot be disregarded.
In East Asia, the United States is re-evaluating its
presence requirements and security needs. The security
relationship between the United States and Japan may be
revised. This could have serious implications for the
entire region especially if it results in a more capable and
more active Japanese military force.
North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear capability is a
troubling dilemma for the United States as it re-evaluates
its presence on the Korean peninsula. While there is little
or no immediate threat to South Korea, the acquisition of a
nuclear capability by North Korea is a probability. In the
absence of U.S. forces, this would be a significant shift in
the regional balance of power and could increase the
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possibility of conflict.
Through all of this, the Western Hemisphere has
emerged as a bastion of democracy. Soviet expansionism is
no longer a threat to U.S. security interests, and the vast
majority of Latin countries have begun the transition to
more democratic forms of government. However, there are
still many complex political and socio-economic problems
that could reverse this trend. These include continued
repression, political violence, and active insurgencies.
A U.N. brokered peace settlement in El Salvador may
be concluded soon. However, this will not result in the
immediate resolution to the fundamental differences between
the Farabundo Marti Liberation Movement (FMLN) insurgents
and the Salvadoran government. Hard questions remain
unanswered concerning the demobilization of insurgents and
government forces, past violations of human rights,
verification mechanisms, and the incorporation the FMLN into
the democratic process. Preserving the peace in El Salvador
will be a long-term proposition.
In Guatemala, UN sponsored negotiations between the
government and guerrillas offer some hope but a final
settlement is still an illusive proposition. 67
Additionally, it is doubtful the right wing Guatemalan
67 Ibid.
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military would voluntarily relinquish a significant portion
of the power it now holds within the Guatemalan political
structure.
In Nicaragua, political liberalization is off to a
shaky start. The Chamorro government's tentative hold on
political power is still threatened by those who control
important positions within the government bureaucracy and
the military. Assassinations of ex-Contras and general
dissatisfaction with the Chamorro government have caused
some ex-Contra's to rearm. A resumption of hostilities
between the "re-Contras" and government forces could unravel
the fragile democracy now in place.
Panama's shaky democracy also calls into question
that country's future and the ability of the United States
to directly affect events in Central America. Barring any
new agreements between the U.S. and Panama, the relocation
of the U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSOUTH) to the
continental United States and the end of a permanent U.S.
military presence in Panama will be effected by 31 December,
1999 in accordance with the Panama Canal Treaties. 68 This
68 There are two distinct treaties that together compose
the Panama Canal Treaties. The basic treaty provides for the
termination and succession of all previous treaties and
includes the provisions for the gradual transfer of control of
the Panama Canal from the U.S. to Panama by the year 2000.
The second treaty is the "Treaty on the Permanent Neutrality
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is a significant development as Central America's geographic
proximity has traditionally made it one of the most
important sub-regions to U.S. security interests.
In the Caribbean, there are no signs that Fidel
Castro is ready to end his dictatorship and embark on a
significant program of political liberalization in Cuba.
Castro still stands as a roadblock to political reform and
Cuba's future is still uncertain. Democracy is not assured
in the rest of the Caribbean either as evidenced by the
recent coup attempt in Trinidad and Tobago and the
successful coup in Haiti.
Economic conditions are far from stable in the
countries of the Southern Cone, making a return to
authoritarianism in that sub-region a possibility that
and Operation of the Canal". Article 5 of this treaty states
that "After the termination of the Panama Canal Treaty (basic
treaty) , only the Republic of Panama shall operate the canal
and maintain military forces, defence sites and military
installations within its national territory" . During the
ratification process in the U.S. Senate, two reservations to
Article 5 where approved and included in resolution of
ratification including a statement. The first reserves the
right of independent action by the either the U.S. or Panama
to secure the continued operation of the canal including the
use of military force if required. The second reserves the
right of the U.S. and Panama to enter into any follow-on
agreements that may be required to preserve the neutrality of
the canal including agreements to station U.S. forces.
Degenhardt, Henry W., Treaties and Alliances of the World , 3rd
ed. (Essex, UK: Longman Group Limited, 1981), 317-8.
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cannot be ignored. Additionally, many traditional
territorial disputes remain unresolved even though some
progress has been made such as the successfully concluded
border negotiations between Chile and Argentina over the
Beagle Channel, most still remain unresolved.
In the Andean sub-region, the continued expansion of
Sendero Luminoso calls into question that country's
political future. Sendero 's successes combined with severe
economic problems increase the possibility of a coup by
military hardliners. 69 Additionally, the possibility that
Sendero Luminoso could expand operations into northern Chile
and Bolivia raises the possibility of a resurgence of
military activity in these countries to counter this threat.
Despite the rise of democracy in Latin America,
regional conflicts and traditional disputes still stand as
significant obstacles to overcome on the road to a truly
democratic hemisphere. The dilemma for U.S. policy-makers
is how to pursue U.S. interests and support Latin America's
democratic transition without arousing resentment and
rekindling traditional fears of U.S. domination. The wrong
policy approach could negatively impact the goal of
69 For a detailed analysis of the situation in Peru, see
Gordon H. McCormick, the Shining Path and the Future of Peru
(March, 1990) .
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"securing democracy" in the Western Hemisphere. 70
4. "Stemming Proliferation"
The availability of advanced military technology and
the proliferation of conventional, nuclear, and chemical
weapons is contributing to worldwide instability. In the
mid-1980s, world-wide weapons production expanded to meet
global demand. 71 To meet this threat in the 1990s, U.S.
policy calls for more emphasis on regional arms control
especially efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery systems.
While the main thrust of the U.S. effort in this
area is still East-West strategic arms reduction and the
European theater, more concern and effort is being placed on
other parts of the world. The Bush administration is
pursuing a "three tiered non-proliferation strategy" in this
effort. 72 This consists of "strengthen [ing] existing non-
proliferation arrangements, expanding membership in multi-
lateral regimes directed against proliferation, and the
70 Robert A. Pastor, "Forging a Hemispheric Bargain: The
Bush Opportunity" , in Journal of International Affairs ,
Vol.43, No.l (Summer/Fall, 1989): 70.
71 In 1986 individual nations spent over $800 billion on
weapons. Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations
(New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1988), 544.
72 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States (August, 1991): 15.
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pursuit of new initiatives". 73
The new initiatives include multi-lateral efforts
such as the Australia Group meeting in May where 20 of the
world's major chemical suppliers agreed to place controls on
equipment and other materials that could be used to
manufacture chemical weapons. They also include a continued
effort to complete the Chemical Weapons Convention to
control the export and sales of chemical and biological
weapons related technologies. 74
Greater control over missile technology is also a
goal of the U.S. administration. Towards this end, U.S.
policy calls for the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) to be strengthened through expanded membership and
improved controls.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains
the center-piece in the world-wide effort to control the
spread of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration
highlights three examples were progress can be claimed. The
first is in Iraq where dismantlement of that country's
nuclear weapons facilities is proceeding as mandated by
United Nations Security Council Resolution 687. The second




attacks on each other's nuclear facilities. The third is in
South America where Brazil and Argentina have agreed to
accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
on all their nuclear facilities and to take steps towards
making Latin America a nuclear free zone as agreed to in the
Treaty of Tlatelolco . 75
However, these examples of progress also highlight
some of the difficulties inherent in controlling nuclear
weapons proliferation. In the case of Iraq, access to
nuclear sites and facilities was gained only after its
defeat in the Gulf War. If this had not occurred, it is
likely Iraq would have continued its pursuit of a nuclear
capability largely unabated. In the Indian-Pakistani case,
the commitments made depend mainly on the goodwill of the
parties involved. This is also true for Brazil and Argentina
in terms of their willingness to allow IAEA oversight.
5. "Illicit Drugs"
International drug trafficking has been identified
as a "major threat" to U.S. national security and Latin
America is the principal focus of U.S. concern. 76 The
United States is the primary market for illegal coca




number one export. 77 Mexico is a principal transit route
for cocaine entering the United States and it is the source
of 80 percent of the marijuana on the U.S. market. 78
Additionally, Jamaica and Belize are active suppliers of
marijuana while Central America and the Caribbean are major
transit routes for illegal narcotics bound for the United
States. 79
The Bush administration's strategy to counter this
threat calls for demand reduction and an "aggressive attack"
on drug producers. In the Western Hemisphere, this includes
working with countries in the Andean sub-region to enhance
local law enforcement and military efforts and increase
public and leadership awareness of the threat. U.S.
economic strategies in this area are intended to strengthen
and diversify the legal economies of the Andean
countries . 80
77 Thomas J. Chassee and Michael M. Cobb, Narcotics and
National Security: Refining the Military Option , MA Thesis





Raphael Perl describes U.S. congressional foreign
policy on illicit drugs as "more 'stick' than 'carrot'". 81
He goes on to describe U.S. international narcotics control
policy as consisting of four elements: eradication measures,
interdiction and law enforcement, international cooperation,
and sanctions . 82 To further his argument, Perl discusses
three pieces of congressional legislation through which the
U.S. Congress has exercised its power over this major
foreign policy issue. These are:
- The Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988 which contains
provisions relating to many federal programs designed to
"curb the supply, use, and abuse of dangerous drugs in
the United States". 83
- The National Defense Authorization Act for 1989 that has
directly involved the Department of Defense (DOD) in the
war on drugs. 84
81 Raphael Perl, "International Narcopolicy and the Role
of Congress", in The Latin American Narcotics trade and U.S.
National Security , Donald J. Malbry, ed. (New York, NY:
Greenwood Press, 1989), 89.
82 Ibid., 90-1.
83 Ibid., 93-100.
84 Key elements of the National Defense Authorization Act
of 1989 include: DOD support to civilian drug enforcement
agencies, the integration of DOD intelligence assets into the
anti-drug intelligence network, authorization to use the
National Guard and other DOD assets in interdiction
operations. Ibid., 100-1.
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- The Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act for 1989
through which Congress exercises its "power of the
purse" to establish U.S. policy designed to both
persuade and dissuade drug producing countries to
cooperate with the United States in its anti-drug
effort. 85
It does seem apparent that the primary focus of U.S.
policy on this issue is on attacking supply. This has the
potential to become a serious foreign policy quagmire for
the United States as it pursues its overall interests in
Latin America. For instance, when does interdiction become
intervention? How far can the United States go in dictating
anti-drug policy to its Latin neighbors without raising
questions of sovereignty and undermining its ability to
achieve other important regional objectives? Can
cooperative strategies achieve U.S. objectives in the war on
drugs? If not, how far is the United States prepared to go
to secure this "major interest"?
There is a serious divergence that exists between
the Latin American and U.S. perspective on this issue.
Latin Americans view the problem as primarily a result of
demand in the United States. On the other hand, United
States policy appears to place greater emphasis on supply
85 Provisions of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act
for 1989 are designed to "intensify efforts aimed at
interdiction and eradication of illicit narcotics, and seek
international cooperation on narcotics enforcement matters".
Ibid., 99-102.
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side counter-measures. Latin American cooperation with the
United States to date seems to be in large part due to their
desire to qualify for U.S. monetary aid and reduce narco-
violence within their own borders rather than an embrace of
U.S. policy.
There is no clear parallel between this non-
traditional threat to the United States and any threat posed
to the United States during the era of Good Neighbor
diplomacy. In fact, there appears to be a closer parallel
between the threat of illicit drugs coming from Latin
America and the ideological threat of a communist strong
hold in Latin America during the Cold War. These parallels
can be summed up as follows:
- Sheer geographic proximity to the United States of a
threat defined as "major" or vital to U.S. interests.
- A divergence of perceptions between the United States
and Latin America as to the nature of the threat.
- A willingness on the part of the United States to use
military forces to combat the threat.
- The lack of a clear consensus between the President and
Congress on U.S. foreign policy objectives concerning
the threat
.
Without a clearly defined and consensual U.S. policy
on this issue, it is unclear whether cooperative strategies
can achieve all expectations in the war on drugs. This
enhances the possibility of unilateral actions being taken
by the United States to combat this threat without first
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weighing the effects of this action against its effects on
other important U.S. regional interests. For this reason,
perhaps no other issue has the potential to derail a broad
effort to enhance regional cooperation based on Good
Neighbor principles.
6. "Immigrants and Refugees"
The number of dislocations world-wide is now 16
million. 86 This represents an increase of 2 million from
1990. 87 The problems exacerbating this crisis range from
famine to brutal oppression. The United States has pledged
to do its share to help alleviate this problem but, at the
same time, admits to its own limitations in this area. 88
Latin migration to the United States has been the
result of both "push" factors in host countries such as war,
political violence, and socio-economic hardship, and "pull"
factors in the U.S. such as the need for unskilled labor. 89
86 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States (August, 1991): 18.
87 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States (March, 1990): 17.
88 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States (August, 1991): 18.
89 See Abraham F. Lowenthal, " Latin America in the 1990s:
Not Berlin but Still Germane" , in Hemisfile (May, 1990), 2.
Georges A. Fauriol, "The Third Century: U.S. Latin American
Policy Choices in the 1990s", in CSIS Significant Issues
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Another way to view this is to see the problem as the result
of favorable socioeconomic and political conditions in the
United States as compared to opposite conditions in many-
parts of Latin America. 90
Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico account
for the vast majority of immigration to the United States
from Latin America. 91 In Central America, a resolution of
ongoing conflicts could help reduce the flow of immigrants
to the United States. Additionally, the end of repression
in some Caribbean nations could also prove beneficial. In
Mexico, Diego C. Asencio forecasts two divergent
possibilities for the future. The positive scenario
foresees economic recovery in Mexico resulting in a
reduction of migration to the United States. The negative
scenario foresees a continuation of economic difficulties
and the continued flow of immigrants to the United
States. 92
In 1990, The Commission for the Study of
International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development
Series , Vol.X, No. 13 (undated): 29-30.
90 Ibid., 29.
91 Ibid.
92 Diego C. Asencio, Immigration and Economic Development
for the 21st Century (undated)
.
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reported to the President and Congress on its prescription
to resolve the problem of undocumented immigration to the
United States. The consensus was that job-creating economic
growth was the best solution to stopping the flow of illegal
immigrants. 93 This conclusion carried with it the
following caveats:
- It will take decades before economic growth reached the
point where illegal immigration was sufficiently-
reduced.
- Continued enforcement to stem the flow of illegal
migrants is needed in the meantime. 94
Georges A Fauriol points out that immigration is an
important issue that the United States has had to deal with
throughout its history, though it has recently taken on a
"salient Latin American dimension". 95 He recommends U.S.
policy initiatives in this area focus primarily on regional
economic growth and hemispheric political stability rather
than law enforcement. 96 Such an approach seems most likely
to resolve the immigration and refugee problem over the
long-term. It also seems more likely to result in
cooperation from Latin America on this issue.
93 Ibid., 8.
94 Ibid.
95 Georges A. Fauriol, The Third Century: U.S. Latin




The projection of the aggregate debt owed by
developing countries for 1990 was $1.3 trillion. 97 The
primary causes of this problem according to the Bush
administration are overvalued exchange rates, large budget
deficits, poor investments, and restrictions on trade and
investment leading to capital flight. 98 Other problems
linked to the debt crisis include high international
interest rates, the 1980s recession, and fluctuations in
energy prices due to the Gulf War. 99
Latin America's share of the world's aggregate debt
burden was $410 billion in 1990, or about one-third. 100
Servicing this debt has created a net outflow of 3 percent
of the region's total output and more than 20 percent of its
export earnings. 101 High inflation rates have compounded
this problem in many countries.
The 1990 Report of the Inter-American Dialogue
outlines three options to overcome the debt problem.
97 Source: the World Bank as quoted in National Security
Strategy of the United States (August, 1991): 20.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 The Americas in a New World , The 1990 Report of the




- Reduce commercial debt burdens under the debt reduction
proposals of the Brady Plan.
- Forego formal debt-reduction agreements, continue
interest payments, and try to trim the debt through
debt-equity and direct purchasing.
- Unilaterally reduce or stop interest payments through a
moratorium or debt payment ceilings. 102
The report indicates that debt reduction under
option one is slow and, therefore, its usefulness is limited
to countries whose economies are performing fairly well. 103
To date only Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Uruguay, and
Chile have negotiated debt reduction agreements under the
Brady Plan. 104 Option two is recommended only for "the
region's strongest performers". Discounting Chile, Colombia
is the sole candidate. 105. This leaves option three for the
remaining countries. Of the fifteen countries that are
behind in their interest payments, Brazil and Argentina lead
the group with $15 billion in unpaid interest in 1990. 106
This problem has major implications for other important U.S.
102 Ibid., 21-2
103 Ibid., 21.
104 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States , (August, 1991): 20.
105 The Americas in a New World , The 1990 Report of the
Inter-American Dialogue (1990): 21.
106 Ibid., 22.
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objectives. Maintaining large debt burdens will likely
reduce the positive impact of regional free trade. It will
also hinder Latin America's overall economic recovery. This
could create an atmosphere of discontent and pave the way
for a new era of authoritarianism in the region.
8. "The Environment"
The array of global environmental problems of
specific concern to the Bush administration policy makers
include ozone depletion, deforestation, bio-diversity, the
treatment of wastes, climatic change, food security, and
water supply. 107 Of all these issues, deforestation of the
Amazon and the treatment of wastes (industrial pollution) in
Mexico may become the major environmental dilemmas for U.S.-
Latin American relations in the future.
Primary rain forest depletion in Latin America is
most evident in Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia. The
amount of original rain forest remaining in these countries
is 63 percent, 60 percent, 71 percent, and 26 percent
respectively. 108 These forests are cleared to make way for
107 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States (August, 1991), 22.
108 Figures are from multiple sources and are based on
surveys for roadless areas greater than 400,000 hectares where
development is unlikely to have occurred. See Sandra Postel
and John C. Ryan, "Reforming Forestry", in State of the World
(New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), 75.
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crops, grazing land, and construction projects as well as to
support these countries 's timber industry.
However, the United States might find itself facing
an embarrassing diplomatic predicament if it pursues a
belligerent policy towards these countries' s on this issue.
The amount of primary forest remaining in the United States
is 15 percent. 109 Additionally, the United States is the
world's leading producer of wood products accounting for 25
percent of the world market as compared to Brazil's four
percent. Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru each account for
less than one percent of the market share. 110
This is not to say the deforestation issue should be
ignored in U.S. -Latin relations. But it does seem that low-
profile diplomacy and cooperative economic strategies
represent the best hope for success in this area. As a
relatively prosperous post-industrial nation, the United
States runs the risk of appearing ingenuous if it attempts
to dictate ecological policy to newly industrialized and
developing nations. This is particularly true in Latin
America given the high priority countries of the region
place on economic development as a means toward achieving
109 Ibid.
110 Source: U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, Forest
Products Yearbook, as published in State of the World , (New
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), 76.
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long-term economic growth.
NAFTA negotiations have placed Mexico in the
spotlight of environmentalist scrutiny. In an effort to
derail the NAFTA initiative, environmentalists have joined
forces with U.S. labor unions in an effort to defeat this
legislation in Congress. This marriage has produced a
hybrid lobbying effort that emphasizes "the vast differences
in regulatory structures and social protections" between the
United States and Mexico. 111 In their view, U.S. -Mexico
free trade will make it difficult for producers based in the
United States to compete with their Mexican based
counterparts. The predicted result is the loss of jobs in
the United States and the exacerbation of already existing
ecological problems along the U.S. -Mexican border including
indiscriminate dumping, irrigation and drinking water
pollution, wildlife extinction, toxic industrial accidents,
and the lack of waste treatment facilities. 112
The question for U.S. policy here seems to be one of
priorities. Do immediate environmental concerns about the
NAFTA outweigh its long-term potential for bolstering the
economies of both the United States and Mexico? This issue
111 The American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, Exploiting Both Sides: U.S. -Mexico
Free Trade (February, 1991), 7.
112 Ibid.
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represents a dilemma that the administration of FDR did not
have to confront in their trade negotiations with Latin
American countries. The various elements of this issue are
also illustrative of the complexity of inter-American
relations in today's environment.
B. SUMMARIZING AND RATING THE ISSUES
Table 3 provides a graphic display of the issues
discussed above. It also provides a subjective evaluation
of these issues and subregions similar to Table 1.
The horizontal evaluation of the issues in table 3
indicates regional free trade and illicit drugs are the most
significant issues to the U.S. when weighed in terms of sub-
regions affected. Regional free trade is rated "very high"
for Mexico, Brazil, the Southern Cone, and the Andean sub-
regions primarily due to their economic growth potential.
Central America and the Caribbean are rated lower due to
their comparatively small economies. Mexico, Central
America, the Caribbean and the Andean sub-regions receive a
"very high" rating on the drug issue due to their positions
as primary producers, transit areas, or both.
The Southern Cone's rates a "high", given the position of
Bolivia as a primary producer of cocaine. Brazil is rated
lower, given its lower relevance in terms of this issue.
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TABLE 3. SPECIFIC AND OVERALL RATINGS FOR LATIN AMERICAN





















































































































* In order, these are interpretations of " The Growing Role
of Germany and Japan", "The Soviet Future", and "Regional
Free Trade" in terms of their relevance to Latin America.
Securing democracy and debt reduction are the second most
important U.S. regional issues indicated by the analysis in
Table 3. On the issue of democracy, Central America and the
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Caribbean receive the highest rating due to the tenuous hold
of democracy in these sub-regions. Castro's continued
intransigence is also a factor. In the Andean sub-region,
the rating of "very high" is due to the threat Sendero
Luminoso poses to the weak democracy in Peru and the
possibility that the insurgency might spread to other
countries. Concerning debt reduction, the criteria for all
the ratings is a weighted basket of items including total
amount of aggregate debt owed, progress on debt relief, and
the amount of unpaid interest outstanding. The impact of
sub-regional debt on overall regional economic growth is
also a factor.
Countering nationalism stands alone as the next most
significant issue with a rating of "high" for every sub-
region. The threat nationalism and authoritarianism pose to
the United States is their potential to negatively impact
most every other U.S. objective in Latin America. These two
forces have a history of cyclic interaction in Latin
America. Environmental issues rank fourth in overall
significance according to analysis in Table 3. Mexico and
Brazil receive the rating of "very high" due to the
potentially damaging impact of environmental concerns on
NAFTA negotiations and the concern over deforestation in the
Amazon. The deforestation issue is also why the Andean sub-
region receives a rating of "high" . The remaining sub-
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regions receive a lower rating because of the lesser
significance of the environmental issue in these areas as
compared to the other sub-regions.
Stemming the proliferation of weapons and the problem of
immigrants and refugees come in last with an overall
significance of "medium" . This is only because of the
lesser number of sub-regions receiving high ratings on these
issues. Brazil and the Southern Cone's rating of "very
high" on the proliferation issue is due primarily to the
potential of Brazil and Argentina becoming nuclear powers.
The importance of the arms industry to Brazil is also a
factor. Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean receive
the higher ratings on the immigrant and refugee problem
because the overwhelming amount of Latin migration to the
United States originates from these sub-regions.
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IV. WOULD A REGIONAL POLICY BASED ON GOOD NEIGHBOR
PRINCIPLES ACHIEVE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN TODAY'S WORLD?
A U.S. policy towards Latin America based on Good
Neighbor policy principles would likely entail a more equal
sharing of regional power. The dilemma is "how much risk [is
acceptable] in an era of strategic change, fiscal austerity,
and great uncertainty"? 113 If Good Neighbor principles were
incompatible with U.S. security interests during the Cold
War, might they be applicable to changed U.S. security
objectives now that bi-polarity is giving way to multi-
polarity? Would this require Good Neighbor principles to be
re-interpreted to account for any differences between
today's world and the regional environment during FDR's
time?
A. A COMPARISON OF GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY OBJECTIVES AND U.S.
INTERESTS TODAY
The purpose of this section is to delineate the
similarities and differences between the policy goals of FDR
and U.S. regional interests today. This evaluation will
hopefully assist in determining the applicability of Good
Neighbor principles to current U.S. interests.
113 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States (March, 1990): 7.
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1. The Issues
A further evaluation of Table 3 suggests these issues
can logically be grouped together into two major categories
similar to those identified for Good Neighbor objectives on
page 20. The issues "regional free trade" and "debt
reduction" could be categorized together under the broad
term regional economic priorities . The remaining issues
could be characterized as either traditional or non-
traditional U.S. security concerns. Table 4 provides a side
by side comparison of the broad and specific issues in
Tables 1 and 3. This analysis indicates a general
similarity between the broad objectives of the Good Neighbor
policy and U.S. goals in the Western Hemisphere today. This
seems to support the general parallel between the
transitional nature of today's world environment and the
unstable nature of the world FDR faced.
However, Table 4 also illustrates some important
differences. First, the increased complexity of issues in
today's world as compared to the Good Neighbor era is
evidenced by difference in the sheer number of issues.
Second, the security concerns today are mostly non-
traditional as compared to the more conventional threats the
United States faced in the 1930s and 1940s. This is
probably due to the fact that there are no direct threats to
U.S. security from extra-hemispheric powers at this time.
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TABLE 4. A COMPARISON OF BROAD AND SPECIFIC ISSUES
GOOD NEIGHBOR TODAY'S ISSUES
ISSUES
Regional Economic Regional Economic
Priorities Priorities
1) Expanded Trade 1) Regional Free Trade
2) Debt Reduction
U.S. Security Concerns U.S. Security Concerns
(Traditional)
1) Countering 1) Countering
Ultra -National ism Ultra -National ism












A comparison of the overall ratings of issues in
Tables 1 and 3 highlight one other difference. Even though
they are less in number, the specific issues that relate to
regional economic priorities today seem to carry at least
equal weight against the issues comprising U.S. security
concerns. This was not the case during the Good Neighbor
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era, where there seems to be a clear hierarchy of issues
with U.S. security concerns at the top.
2 . The Sub-Regions
Comparing the overall sub-region ratings from Tables 1
and 3 suggests a general hierarchical correlation between
the significance in each sub-region to U.S. interests today
and their significance in the 1930s and 1940s. This
correlation is indicative of the recent change in U.S.
perspective concerning regional issues. During the Cold War
period, Central America and the Caribbean would have
undoubtedly received ratings of "very high" due to the geo-
political nature of issues at that time.
The differences between specific sub-region ratings in
Tables 1 and 3 can be attributed to the added number and
more diverse nature of the issues facing U.S. policy-makers
today. However, it is also important to note that the sub-
regional ratings in Table 1 are grouped closer together than
those in Table 3 . This may be an indication that sub-
regional distinctions did not figure prominently in Good
Neighbor diplomacy. The emphasis Good Neighbor principles
placed on hemispheric solidarity and collective action also
lend credence to this analysis.
In summary, the major parallels evidenced in Tables 1
and 3 seem to be broad in nature, while differences are
apparent in the details of each issue and how they relate to
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specific sub-regions. This indicates that Good Neighbor
principles might be applicable but that some re-
interpretation may be necessary.
B. ARE U.S. INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF LATIN AMERICA
CONVERGING?
Generalizations are often used to summarize the
relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Richard
Bloomfield believes the relationship is based on a dichotomy
of interests. From the Latin perspective, this is "the
enduring problem [of] how to cope with the greater power of
the United States: how to benefit from it and how to avoid
being dominated by it." 114 From the U.S. perspective, the
problem has been "how to prevent [U.S.] enemies from using
the relative weakness of Latin American political
institutions to threaten U.S. national interests." 115
Similar points have been made by others. 116 However,
114 Richard Bloomfield, "Suppressing the Interventionist
Impulse", in Alternative to Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1990), 115-6.
115 Ibid., 116.
ii6 nrp^g evolution of U.S. -Latin American relations. . . .can
perhaps best be summed up as a continuous drive for [U.S.]
influence, if not control, in the Western Hemisphere".
Michael Kryzanek, U.S. Latin American relations , 2nd ed. (New
York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 94. " Shifting U. S . policy
approaches -whether interventionist, noninterventionist
,
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accepting these statements outright runs the risk of masking
important sub-regional issues in which the United States and
Latin American states may share common interests. 117
During the Cold War, inter-American cooperation was
hindered by differences of method and priorities. With the
end of the Cold War and political liberalization underway in
Latin America, these differences are vanishing and the
barriers to cooperation in many areas are beginning to come
down. Regional free trade is an issue of great interest to
both the United States and Latin America for the same
reason - economic survival in a highly competitive global
market place.
In 1984, Abraham Lowenthal called the democratic trend in
Latin America an opportunity for "inter-American cooperation
beyond the economic realm". 118 This was a reflection of
developmentalist , or benign neglect-spring from... two basic
objectives-to exclude foreign threats and to encourage
stability". G. Atkins, Latin America in the International
Security System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 109.
117 Robert A. Pastor, "Forging a Hemispheric Bargain: The
Bush Opportunity", in Journal of International Affairs ,
Vol.43, No.l (Summer/Fall, 1989): 70. U.S. and Latin America:
A Shared Destiny , a speech by Secretary of State James Baker
before the Council of the Americas in Washington D.C., 1 May
1989, published in Current Policy Bulletin No. 1167 (June,
1989) : 1.
118 Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict (Baltimore,
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 187.
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his claim that, though the most important benefits to be
derived from cooperation are in the resumption of economic
growth and expanded trade, a concerted U.S. effort to
enhance overall inter-American cooperation could have
positive effects in other areas of U.S. concern such as
strenghtening democracy, curbing the drug trade, and
promoting peace and security. 119 He went on to say that
multi-lateral efforts are far more likely to be successful
than bilateral efforts. However he did qualify this
statement by saying that the most important contributions
the U.S. can make to the democratization process are
indirect . 12 °
The elimination of Cold War restraints and imperatives
makes the fulfillment of Lowenthal's general prescriptions
and U.S. security objectives in Central America much more
feasible today than in the mid 1980s. It is fair to say
that Bloomfield is generally correct when he states that
something has changed in the relationship between the U.S.
and Latin America. 121 For one, the traditional threats of
the Cold War are no longer pre-imminent but neither have
119 Ibid., 181-195.
120 Ibid., 188-9.
121 Richard Bloomfield, "Suppressing the Interventionist
Impulse" , in Alternative to Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1990), 117.
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they been completely relegated to the past as Bloomfield
suggests. 122 Cuba is still a concern even though changes
and a turn toward democracy are viewed by U.S.
administration policy-makers as "inevitable". 123 Regional
conflicts are still considered serious threats to U.S.
interests but not in terms of their geo-political
implications and the need to contain the Soviet sphere of
influence. As a result, new opportunities for inter-
American cooperation have been opened.
With these new opportunities, new dangers also emerge.
Despite Lowenthal's assertion that a cooperative approach
could reduce the threat posed by the drug problem, this
issue still represents a high priority, non-traditional
security threat to the United States. As discussed in
Chapter II, this issue has the potential to seriously dampen
hopes for U.S. -Latin American cooperation on a large
scale. 124
122 Ibid.
123 The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States , (August, 1991), 8.
124 Bloomfield prefers to call the drug problem a U.S.
"vulnerability" and rightly points out that it is the result
of both the demand for drugs in the U.S. and Latin America's
economic weakness. Richard Bloomfield, "Suppressing the
Interventionist Impulse" in Alternative to Intervention
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 117.
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A divergence does exist between U.S. and Latin interests
on the issue of illicit drugs. From the Latin perspective,
the primary concern is in-country narco-violence . United
States concerns revolve around the corrosive effect drug use
and narco-traf f icking have on the social fabric of America.
The difference in perspective is important in making a
determination of how much risk the United States is willing
to take in its policies concerning this threat. 125
Both U.S. and Latin American interests are being
transformed by the forces shaping the new paradigm. Non-
traditional threats to U.S. national interests have primacy
over the traditional threats of the Cold War. At the same
time, Latin America's interests are expanding as they see




125 For a discussion of some unilateral and multi-lateral
policy options see Donald J. Malbry, The Latin American
Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security (New York, NY:
Greenwood Press, 1989) .
126 Georges A. Fauriol refers to this development as "the
birth of a new Latin American regionalism" sparked by the
actions of the most involved Latin American nations. He
suggests an optimistic view of this phenomena indicates more
dynamic leadership and political maturity in Latin America as
well as changes in U.S. policy. These trends are also an
indication that the U.S. -Latin American relations are reaching
a "more mature plateau". Georges A. Fauriol, "The Third
Century: U.S. -Latin American Policy Choices for the 1990s",
CSIS Significant Issues Series , Vol.X, No. 13 (undated), 13-4.
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In this environment where interests overlap, achieving
both U.S. and Latin American long-term objectives in a more
competitive world may well depend on cooperation. From this
perspective, the principles of the Good Neighbor policy may
prove relevant to overall U.S. regional policy initiatives.
C. THE GOOD NEIGHBOR PRINCIPLES REVISITED
The following sub-sections are an attempt to re-interpret
Good Neighbor policy principles as defined in Chapter I to
fit the realities of today's regional environment.
1. The Creation and Maintenance of Cordial and Intimate
Relations Between the United States and Other American
Republics
This principle is the foundation of the Good Neighbor
policy. Table 2 illustrates the applicability of this
principle to all the objectives of the Good Neighbor policy.
It represents an ideal relationship that may seem
unattainable today, but could be realized when and if the
transition to true regional interdependence occurs and
global stability is achieved.
Cordial and intimate relations were never fully
realized during the era of Good Neighbor diplomacy. The end
of World War II did not result in an interdependent and
secure world, and the pursuit of hemispheric solidarity
quickly vanished as a goal of U.S. policy. However, the
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honest attempt by FDR and his administration adhere to this
principle was an important factor in the overall success of
the Good Neighbor policy. In striving for the ideal,
progress was made.
The diplomatic ground work necessary to move the
United States in this direction has already been laid. In
1989, U.S. Secretary of State Baker addressed the Council of
the Americas and stated his belief that "the region's
democratic leaders are reaching out to the United States to
offer a new partnership, one based on mutual respect and one
based on shared responsibility" and that the administration
of President Bush is also reaching out. 127 Deputy
Secretary Eagleberger also represented to the OAS that
President Bush sees the chance to create an historic new
partnership within the hemisphere and that this goal is at
the top of his agenda. 128 This reinforced the President's
own statements to the Council of the Americas a year earlier
when he said the U.S. "must offer [Central and South
127
"U.S. and Latin America: A Shared Destiny", an address
by Secretary of State James Baker before the Council of the
Americas, Washington, D.C., 1 May 1989, published in Current
Policy , Bulletin No. 1167 (June, 1989): 1.
128
"Western Hemisphere Holds Unique Place for Freedom"
,
an address by Deputy Secretary Eagleberger to the 21st General
Assembly of the OAS, Santiago, Chile, 3 June 1991, as
published in Dispatch , Vol.2, No. 23 (10 June, 1991): 414-7.
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America] our help and something more, we must offer them our
respect, the respect due one free nation from another, and
the outreached hand of partnership." 129
The pursuit of this objective by the United States,
even though it may never be fully achieved, would seem to be
a key element to the successful application of Good Neighbor
principles today just as it was in the 1930s and early
1940s. Attainment of this goal is not as important as the
ideal it represents. It is the foundation upon which the
other principles stand. Therefore, no re-interpretation
seems appropriate.
2. The Principle of Continental Self -Defense and the
Adoption of this Principle by All American Republics
Hemispheric security cooperation has been one of the
most contentious issues in U.S. -Latin American relations.
The Rio Treaty represents the codification of this
principle. However, the ideological battle of the Cold War
left too much room for interpretation. For instance, does
the right of self-defense extend to ideology? From the
perspective of the U.S. policy-makers who institutionalized
the strategy of containment in NSC-68, the answer was yes.
From the perspective of many Latins, communist insurgencies
129
"Latin America's Year of Freedom", remarks by
President Bush to the Council to the Americas, Washington,
D.C., 22 May 1990, as published in Current Policy , Bulletin
No. 1286, (undated), 1-2.
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and leftist movements were responses to indigenous social
injustice and were not a threat to the United States.
What is the situation today? Richard Bloomfield
believes the U.S. and Latin America have "the best
opportunity since the Good Neighbor Policy of creating an
effective collective security system in the Americas" now
that the "ideological enemy [USSR]" that "has bedeviled"




formula calls for an arrangement where Latin America assumes
the responsibility for collective security taking U.S.
security imperatives into account. This system would be
built upon the initiatives of the Contadora Group and its




Bloomfield' s plan seems a bit narrow given the
complexity and diverse nature of today's regional security
environment. For one, the drug issue seems to have replaced
the threat of communism as the United State's most important
security concern. From this perspective, drug interdiction
has the potential to replace traditional intervention as a
primary tool to secure this "major" U.S. interest.
130 Richard Bloomfield, "Suppressing the Interventionist
Impulse", in Alternative to Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1990), 130-1.
131 Ibid., 131-3.
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Bloomf ield does not account for this kind of non-traditional
threat in his analysis. Additionally, his solutions
apparently would not include criteria for the use of force
or a mechanism for implementing an inter-American decision
to use force to secure multi-lateral security interests.
What are the alternatives? One possibility might be a
re-alignment of the goals and objectives of the Inter-
American system to fit the realities of today and to reflect
a common vision for future hemispheric security cooperation.
This could include a collective definition of hemispheric
interests and the threats to those interests including non-
traditional threats. 132
On the practical side, some changes to existing organs
of the inter-American system would likely be required and
some new mechanisms might be needed to fully implement
multi-lateral decisions on issues of hemispheric security.
This is especially true in the area of enforcement.
There are essentially three stages of cooperative
actions to counter threats to and breeches of peace.
132 Georges Fauriol believes mechanisms such as the Rio
Treaty and OAS need to be scrutinized to assure their
continuing effectiveness. An important aspect of this process
is a clear indication from the U.S. of its expectations form
these mechanisms and active participation by the U.S. in their
institutional development. Georges A. Fauriol, "The Third
Century: U.S. -Latin American Policy Choices for the 1990s", in
CSIS Significant Issues Series (undated), 16-17.
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These are:
- Automatic actions that go into effect or are carried out
by prior agreement without the need for further
consultation
.
- Organized actions by organs empowered by members of a
community of nations to maintain or restore peace.
- Institutionalized joint action involving the use of an
armed force under the authority of an organ of a
community of nations. 133
At present, the Rio Treaty (1947) and the Charter of
the OAS (1948) include provisions that fall under the first
and second categories. There are a number of initiatives
that could be undertaken to strengthen these instruments.
First, a resolution that reaffirms all party's commitment to
the provisions of the Rio Treaty could be pursued with
Particular attention being paid to Articles 3, 6, 7, 8, 9,
11, 20, and 21. These articles form the foundation for
multi-lateral enforcement action. Consensual agreement
could be sought to elaborate and build on Article 8 which
deals with enforcement measures. In this way, non-
traditional security threats could be addressed. Such an
agreement could include graduated courses of action,
including the use of force, to deal with all types of
threats
.
133 Ann Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization of
American States (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University
Press, 1963), 205-6.
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An additional measure that might be pursued to deal
specifically with traditional security issues is a
commitment not to recognize new governments installed by
undemocratic means. This could help clarify the inter-
American position on the principle of government
recognition. It could also be helpful by sending a clear
signal that, in the consensual opinion of OAS members,
governments that come into being through undemocratic means
demonstrate their unwillingness to abide by the general
rules of international law and are therefore
illegitimate. 134 Adoption of this principle might fulfill
a long sought goal of the inter-American community by
establishing a uniform basis for collective action in this
area. 135
134 This is the axiological approach to recognition which
accepts the premise that, in addition to the mere fact of a
governments existence, certain principles of behavior must be
met in order for a government to be recognized. These
principles are established and agreed to by States and become
additional criteria for recognition. Otherwise, the rule of
law can never replace power as the foundation for relations
among States. For an excellent summary of the legalities of
recognition and the practices of the inter-American community
in this area, see Ann Thomas and A. J. Thomas Jr., The
Organization of American States (Dallas, TX: Southern
Methodist University Press, 1963), 176-87.
135 Ibid. , 182.
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However, there is at least one legality that would
have to be dealt with for the principle of non-recognition
to be effective. Legal interpretation of Article 34 of the
OAS charter supports the position that a member State has
the right to be present and vote at inter-American
conferences even if the government of the member state does
not fulfill the legal requirements for recognition. In
other words, state recognition is the criteria for
participation in the OAS, not governmental recognition. 136
Solving this problem presents two dilemmas. At what
point does an unyielding position on recognition by the OAS
become a roadblock to its effectiveness as a forum for
resolving problems of hemispheric security? If the OAS
simply ignores and blacklists those governments considered
undemocratic, how can it actively seek to influence those
governments to pursue a path of political liberation and
establish democratic institutions?
Part of the solution might be to amend Article 34 and
establish governmental recognition by a vote of two-thirds
136 Legally, the recognition of a state and the
recognition of a government are two distinct matters. The
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties establishes the
inter-American requirements of statehood and international
personality. These are permanent population, defined
territory, government, and the capacity to enter into
relations with other states. Ibid.
77
majority as the criteria for bestowing OAS voting privileges
on new governments. This would still allow the state the
right of representation in the OAS but the right to vote
would be withheld as an incentive to undertake democratic
reforms
.
Not all would agree that the OAS could function as the
principal vehicle for cooperative security action. Some
believe the role the Inter-American community in meeting
future regional security challenges should be limited to
supporting UN processes and relatively minor issues. 137
Bloomfield argues that attempts to reform the OAS should be
avoided because it has been "tinkered" with ever since its
inception. 138 However, this belief is not shared by
everyone including the President of Venezuela, Carlos Andres
Perez, who believes fundamental changes in attitudes and
circumstances are already underway and that "fundamental
reform of the OAS and [the] entire inter-American system" is
feasible. 139 He goes on to point at that this reform "must
foster a new understanding of the OAS's role if fulfilling
137 The Americas in a New World , The 1990 Report of the
Inter-American Dialogue (1990): 53-4.
138 Richard Bloomfield, Alternative to Intervention
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 134.
139 Carlos Andres Perez, "OAS Opportunities", in Foreign
Policy , No. 80 (Fall, 1990): 54.
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the values proclaimed in the charter". 140 Additionally,
the 1990 Inter-American Dialogue calls for the
strengthening of regional institutions to "deal effectively
with the new agenda of issues in the 1990s". 141
Given the changes in the world since 1948 and the new
priorities of the 1990s, the renewal and revision of inter-
American enforcement instruments could help draw a new
baseline for cooperation in this area. It could also help
rid the inter-American system of much of the negativeness
left over from the Cold War.
On the other hand, there are those who support the
assertion that the Inter-American system should become more
active even in the area of security. Wayne S. Smith in a
discussion of the Monroe Doctrine states his belief that
U.S. leaders should do today what was intended in 1947 and
1948 and "transform the doctrine into a multi-lateral
statement of intent guiding the collective security
apparatus of the GAS". 142 Howard Wiarda also argues for a
140 Ibid.
141 The Americas in a New World , The 1990 report of the
Inter-American Dialogue (1990): 16.
142 Wayne S. Smith, "The United States and South America:
Beyond the Monroe Doctrine" , in Current History (February,
1991) : 52.
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revival of inter-American defense arrangements. 143
Progress and agreement on multi-lateral security-
cooperation appear key to achieving U.S. security objectives
in Latin America. However, to be applicable to today's
security concerns, the principle of continental self-defense
seems to require re-interpretation to include non-
traditional security threats and intra-regional threats in
addition to more traditional security threats. From this
perspective, a revision of this principle might read: "The
principle of hemispheric security cooperation and the
adoption of this principle by all American republics" .
3. Consultation between American Republics when the Peace
and Weil-Being of the American World is in Question
This concept was also embodied in the Rio Treaty and
the OAS charter. Here again, a rejuvenated a refocused OAS
may be the answer. It could serve as a valuable forum for
consultations on traditional issues of security as well as
the non-traditional issues of Latin debt, drug-trafficking,
immigrants and refugees, weapons proliferation, and the
environment. In today's international-political
environment, regional governmental organizations may prove
to be the best vehicles for the both consultations and the
143 Howard J. Wiarda, "United States Strategic Policy in
Latin America in the Post-Cold War Era", a paper prepared for
the Symposium on Latin America to the National Defense
University, Washington, D.C. (10-12 November 1990): 18-9.
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channeling of multi-lateral action on such issues.
The United States seems to recognize this change in
affairs. In a speech before the Council of the Americas,
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said "the problems we
face will not be resolved through quick promises .. .and easy
answers. Instead, we've got to confront them together;
we've got to confront them with candor; we've got to
confront them with commitment; and we've got to confront
them with courage". 144 Inherent in this statement is the
need for more active diplomacy and consultation to ensure
U.S. interests and concerns are integrated into the
cooperative process.
To be truly effective in meeting the expectations of
U.S. policy statements, inter-American diplomacy should
include all issues from the total spectrum of both United
States and Latin American regional interests. Candor and
openness are key to the success of such a strategy. The
failure of the United States to make its interests and
concerns known could hinder current and future cooperative
initiatives by forcing Latin American countries to second
guess U.S. intentions. Well defined and clearly articulated
144
"U.S. and Latin America: A Shared Destiny", an address
by Secretary of State James Baker before the Council of the
Americas, Washington, D.C., 1 May 1989, in Current Policy ,
Bulletin No. 1167 (June, 1989): 1.
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U.S. objectives are essential if miscalculations and
misunderstandings are to be avoided. A revitalized OAS
could prove to be the most appropriate arena for this
purpose.
It is possible for established international
organizations such as the OAS to acquire new meaning and
importance given a certain set of changed circumstances. In
a study of the Inter-American system by the American Society
of International Law conducted in 1979, William D. Rogers
writes "....institutions, like the law itself, must be
regularly tested against the contemporary interests and
needs of mankind. . . . the question is not whether the Inter-
American System is benignly good but whether it is
affirmatively superior to other feasible ways of organizing
the common business of the Americas". 145
As with the second Good Neighbor principle, the
concept of inter-American consultation could be expanded
beyond the scope of traditional security concerns to include
non-traditional threats. It could also include the realm of
regional economic cooperation. This might provide new
impetus for reducing Latin America's debt burden and
145 Rogers, William D., "A Note on the Future of the
Inter-American System" , in The Future of the Inter-American
System , (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 20.
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achieving the goals of the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative.
Based of the above discussion, a re-conceptualization
of the principle of consultation seems in order. This would
place more reliance on the OAS and other international
organizations as vehicles for addressing the full spectrum
of inter-American issues. However, no revision to the
wording of this principle appears necessary.
4. The Acceptance of Pan-American Responsibilities by All
Republics on Equal Terms, and the Development of a
Mechanism for Carrying Out that Obligation
What separates this principle from the others is the
concept of equality between the United States and Latin
America in terms of their ability in dealing with regional
problems. This implies a relationship of mutual dependence
or pure interdependence that does not exist at this time.
Perhaps the best way to describe the U.S. -Latin
American relationship today is to apply Bruce Bagley's
concept of "asymmetrical interdependence". 146 The
foundation of this concept as he applied it to U.S. -Mexican
relations is the unevenness of interdependence that
"undeniably confers an overall advantage on the United
146 Bruce Bagley, "The Politics of Asymmetrical
Interdependence: U.S. -Mexican Relations in the 1980s", in The
Caribbean Challenge
,
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984) , 141-
3.
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States". 147 However, this does not imply superiority.
Additionally, Bagley is quick to point out that, in the case
of the United States and Mexico, growing interdependence has
often increased Mexico's autonomy and constrained the United
States from the use of its power. 148 In effect, Mexico has
succeeded in limiting U.S. power by making unilateral action
by the United States against Mexico damaging to its own
interests , 149
The point is that the power relationship between the
United States and other American states is asymmetrical.
This reality will probably remain true for the foreseeable
future. 150 Conceptualizing such a relationship is
difficult due to its inherently dynamic nature. Georges A.
Fauriol offers two possible approaches to day-to-day policy-
making in the United States that he feels accounts for the




150 Abraham Lowenthal also acknowledges the asymmetrical
power relationship between the U.S. and Latin America nations.
However, he points out that Latin strength increased through
the 1960s and 1970s relative to the U.S. to the point where,
by 1980, U.S. dominance in the hemisphere had been reduced to
the lowest point since World War II. Abraham Lowenthal,
Partners in Conflict (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1987), 25.
84
relationship". 151 The first is the "two tiered" approach
that would require an open recognition of the distinctions
U.S. policy-makers already make between its relations with
Mexico and Brazil which are bilateral, and the multi-lateral
relationship that exists with the rest of Latin America. 152
The second is the "equatorial approach". This would build on
what Fauriol considers the relatively well-defined issues
and interests involved in U.S. relations with Brazil,
Colombia, and Venezuela. These countries are located in the
geographic mid-section of the hemisphere. Therefore, well
developed relations with these countries could serve as an
"anchor of stability" in the region. 153 Both approaches
would complement the North American community concept which
would be built around the economic integration of the United
States, Canada, and Mexico. 154
These approaches seem reasonable, but there are risks
involved in institutionalizing any static concept of the
power relationships between the United States and the other
American republics. Establishing such a mind set may limit
151 Georges A. Fauriol, "The Third Century: U.S. -Latin
American Policy Choices for the 1990s", in CSIS Significant





the channels available for pursuing U.S. policy initiatives.
This in turn could result in unproductive and wasteful
efforts. Additionally, certain policy initiatives may
require unique approaches to be successful. In these cases,
flexibility is a key element to policy responsiveness in
keeping up with changing circumstances and the best approach
may well be to determination what actions and methods are
best suited to the situation at hand.
As the region's dominant and most economically stable
power, the United States will likely bear an unequal share
of "pan-American responsibilities" for the foreseeable
future. From this perspective, it might be tempting for the
United States to pursue a more unilateral course of action
in determining what these responsibilities are and how they
should be fulfilled. The question is whether or not this
course of action would be more likely to achieve U.S.
regional objectives than cooperative efforts.
The changed nature of the threats to U.S. security
seem to indicate cooperative efforts have a better chance
for securing the overall objectives of the United States
over the long-term. At the same time, the diverse nature of
U.S. interests and differences in the individual interests
of other American states makes it apparent that broad
collective action may not always be practical or possible.
The issues of proliferation, the environment, immigrants and
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refugees, and illicit drugs fall into this category.
Considering the above discussion, a re-interpretation
of the fourth Good Neighbor principle seems appropriate.
This re-interpretation should include the recognition of the
asymmetrical power relationship that exists between American
states and the impact of this asymmetry in terms of
hemispheric responsibility and the ability of some nations
to address certain issues. With this in mind, a revision of
this principle might read: "The acceptance of pan-American
responsibilities by all republics, and the development of
multi-lateral mechanisms for carrying out that obligation"
.
This implies the renewal of inter-American mechanisms to
make them more responsive to today's problems and concerns.
It also implies the need for new inter-American mechanisms
to address many of the non-traditional issues the American
community now faces. This perspective accepts the fact that
true interdependence does not yet exist and that different
issues will impact the various members of the inter-American
community with unequal force. Therefore, multi-lateral
mechanisms rather that collective mechanisms may be the best
vehicles for pursuing many inter-American objectives.
5. The Abolition of All Barriers and Restrictions to
Trade between Nations of the Americas
The "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative" and other
moves toward regional free trade are positive steps in this
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direction. Additionally, a clear inter-American consensus
on the direction and scope of regional free trade
initiatives could also provide collective leverage during
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations
and negotiations with other trade blocs. Such a consensus
could also provide the President with a regional mandate to
use as leverage in the U.S. Congress to gain support for
regional free trade initiatives. The future of U.S. -Latin
American free trade may well be determined later this year
by the success or failure of the NAFTA. The battle lines
are already drawn and the fight in the U.S. Congress for
ratification of any agreement is expected to be bitter. 155
Matching this principle to today's realities might be
accomplished by placing more emphasis on the need for
regional economic expansion as an indispensable element of
the overall objective. Free trade and regional economic
expansion should be considered equally important for the
155 Kiplinger believes labor unions are the biggest
obstacle as low Mexican wages could undercut steel, textiles,
cement, and mining in the United States. Fruit and vegetable
growers are also vulnerable. Ibid. Some manufacturers and
farmers fear consider the different environmental standards of
the U.S. and Mexico represent an unfair competition. Thirty-
seven members of Congress want such an agreement to include
issues of health and labor as well as environmental factors.
Clyde Farnsworth, "Environment versus Freer Trade" as reported
in The New York Times (2 February, 1991): C4
.
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long-term success of a mutually beneficial trade
relationship. This could account for the added importance
of eliminating Latin debt as well as other initiatives
designed to spur economic development in Latin America.
Economic expansion was an objective of the bilateral
free trade agreements that were negotiated and ratified
during the Good Neighbor era. However, the bilateral nature
of these agreements may have been a factor in their limited
success. If hemispheric free trade is the objective today,
a multi-lateral approach may hold more promise for achieving
this end.
An expression of this re-conceptualized principle
might read: "the abolition of all barriers and restrictions
to trade between nations of the Americas and the pursuit of
hemispheric economic expansion" .
D. PAIRING REVISED GOOD NEIGHBOR PRINCIPLES TO SPECIFIC U.S.
OBJECTIVES
Table 5 correlates today's broad and specific issues with
revised Good Neighbor policy principles (RGNPP) . These
correlations suggest that U.S. regional interests could be
pursued through a policy based on revised Good Neighbor
principles. However, the number of correlations are an
indication of the need for a comprehensive and well
organized diplomatic strategy in order for such a policy to
fulfill all its objectives.
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It took FDR and his administration well over a decade to
achieve many of the objectives of the original Good Neighbor
policy. In today's more complex world, it seems reasonable
to conclude that pursuing policy initiatives based on Good
Neighbor principles is a long term proposition that may take
decades to achieve their ultimate goals.
TABLE 5. REVISED GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY




1) Regional Free Trade
2) Debt Reduction
1, 3, & 5
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1, 2, 3, & 4
1, 3, & 4
1, 3, & 4
1, 3, & 4
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In this light, are the revised Good Neighbor policy
principles suggested above worth the time and effort? Do
they represent the best chance for the United States to
achieve its regional objectives? If not, what are the other
policy options that might be pursued?
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VI. CONCLUSION
Figure 1 provides five possible foundations for U.S.
policy towards Latin America. They are a function of the
importance of Latin America to the United States in a
transitional, multi-polar world where power is shared, but
the U.S. is the principaL actor. This is an important point
because a change in the international system alters the
variables and their relative worth in achieving U.S.
objectives. Additionally, the figure characterizes the type
of action required at a regional level to secure U.S.
security interests as Latin America's relative importance
fluctuates. Table 6 provides definitions for the terms used
in Figure 1. The following sections are a subjective
analysis of each policy option's relative worth.
A. U.S. REGIONAL POLICY OPTIONS
1. Benign Neglect
A policy of benign neglect implies that there are no
regional issues of any relevance to broad U.S. interests.
If this were the case, Latin America could be removed from
the mainstream of U.S. policy concerns. Benign neglect also
implies that ignoring Latin America would have no negative
impact on U.S. policy objectives elsewhere in the world.
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None Somewhat Important Vital Critical
Significant
Benign Pure Cooperative U.S. Pre-








.Relative position of the Good Neighbor policy.
** See Table 6 for glossary of terms for Figure 1
Figure 1 . U.S. policy options tor Latin America as a
function of the relative importance of Latin America to U.S.
national interests in a transitional, multi-polar world.
Consequently, poor U.S. -Latin relations would be an
acceptable cost incurred by the lack of interaction between
the U.S. and other American states.
The scenario above is not consistent with the nature
of the present world environment or the goals of broad U.S.
interests in the world. Benign neglect represents a
regional policy option that invloves a large amount of risk
that important U.S. objectives will be not be realized.
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TABLE 6. GLOSSARY OF TERMS FOR FIGURE 1
Benign Neglect - Neglect without malice.
Collective - marked by similarity among or with members of a
group. Common action by all members of an association of
nations
.
Consensual - General agreement on a course of action as
determined by most of those concerned.
Cooperative Multi-Lateralism - The positive and effective
pursuit of policy goals agreed to by a group nations.
Critical - U.S. interests in Latin America are indispensable
to overcoming a crisis that threatens the survival of the
United States.
Important - U.S. interests in Latin America have a significant
impact on the broad national interests of the United
States
.
Maximalist - Immediate and direct action is required to secure
U.S. interests.
Neutral - Indifferent.
Pre-Emptive Interventionism - An extreme unilateral policy
designed to overcome conditions that threaten the
existence of the United States.
Pure Pan-Americanism - Perfect cooperation among the pan-
American nations.
Somewhat Significant - U.S. interests in Latin America have
some consequence for broader U.S. interests.
Unilateral - Policy initiatives undertaken by the United
States alone.
U.S. Hegemony - A preponderant influence or authority of the
United States over other regional states.
Vital - Securing U.S. interests in Latin America is essential
to the continued well-being of the United States.
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If pursued, this could leave U.S. policy-makers unprepared
to address as yet unforeseen threats and opportunities in
Latin America.
Some argue that the United States is already heading
for another period of benign neglect similar to the 1970s
when aid levels were reduced and the United States focused
on more pressing issues elsewhere. 156 The reasons cited
are the reduced Soviet threat, electoral defeat of the
Sandinistas, new democratic regimes, a reduced Soviet
involvement in Central America, and U.S. preoccupation in
other parts of the world. 157 The counter-argument to this
position holds that geographic proximity, drug trafficking,
immigration and refugees, changing attitudes, and world
economic trends will make it impossible for the United
States to ignore Latin America. 158
156 See Howard J. Wiarda, "United States Strategic Policy
in Latin America in the Post-Cold War Era", in a paper
prepared for the Symposium on Latin America at the National
Defense University, Washington, D.C. (10-12 November, 1990) .
For a discussion of a number of alternative paths for U.S.
policy in Latin America see Susan K. Purcell, "The U.S. and
Regional Conflicts", in a paper prepared for The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 32nd Annual Conference, Hot




It is clear that the United States has definite
interests in Latin America that affect our national
objectives. For this reason, benign neglect does not appear
to be a sound policy option for the United States to pursue.
2. Pre-emptive Interventionism
The significantly reduced threat to U.S. security, the
positive developments in Latin America, and U.S. goals as
stated in the Bush administration's national security
strategy should rule out pre-emptive interventionism as a
foundation for U.S. policy, unless there is a radical
reversal of the positive trends now underway. For now,
securing U.S. interests in Latin America appears non-
critical to the survival of the United States. Though
threats to U.S. security do exist in the region, they have
not escalated to the point where the very existence of the
United States is threatened. This is the ultimate criteron
for embarking on such policy.
3 . Pure Pan-Americanism
Pure pan-Americanism implies an active and intimate
relationship, perfect unity on issues of collective
security, and a truly equal partnership in addressing all
issues of mutual concern. Such unanimity was never achieved
by the Good Neighbor policy as implemented by FDR and it
probably never will be fully realized. However, this policy
option is more in line with current realities than either
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benign neglect or pre-emptive interventionism. Therefore, a
brief summary of possible benefits and costs of this policy
option seems appropriate.
The benefits of adopting a policy based on ideal pan-
Americanism might include the following:
- A greatly improved image for the U.S. in the eyes of
most Latin Americans.
- An improved image for the United States in the eyes of
most developing countries around the world.
- A shared burden in collective security which might free
resources for other programs
.
- A reduced fear of U.S. dominance among Latin Americans
possibly leading to closer economic ties and
acceleration towards free trade.
- Greater credibility for the United States on issues of
human rights.
The costs of this policy might include:
- Relinquishing the role of the United States as the
dominant actor in hemispheric affairs.
- Reducing significantly the capability or inability to
directly affect the outcome of regional events.
- Rejecting of the notion that traditional security
concerns of the United States still pose a threat to
U.S. national interests.
- Allowing Latin America to take the lead in Caribbean and
Latin American collective security with no commitment on
their part to use armed force as a last resort.
- Accepting the probability that the United States would
be perceived by its extra-regional allies and potential
adversaries as retreating from a position of strength.
The risks associated with this option are probably too
great for the United States to accept at this time.
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The uncertainties in the world are too many for the United
States to feel comfortably secure. Additionally, the
importance of the war on drugs will probably provide enough
impetus on its own to keep the United States actively and
directly involved in regional issues. Finally, such a
policy does not take into account the asymmetries in the
U.S. -Latin American relationship or the transitional nature
of the international system. When and if world order is
achieved, and a more balanced interdependence develops
between the United States and Latin America, a policy based
on ideal pan-Americanism might then be a possibility.
4 . U.S. Hegemony
U.S. hegemony could be viewed as a pure application of
Monroe Doctrine principles, with the Roosevelt Corollary the
best historical example of this policy in action. This
might also be used to characterize U.S. policy towards
Central America and the Caribbean through the decade of the
1980s. The changed nature of the world would seem to
indicate this policy option would not be successful in
meeting changed U.S. objectives in Latin America.
Nevertheless, a brief summary of the benefits and costs of
adopting such a policy might be useful in placing other
options in the proper perspective.
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The benefits of adopting this policy could include:
- The willingness to unilaterally intervene to secure U.S.
interests
.
- The achievement of short-term stability through quick
and direct U.S. action.
- Unquestioned dominance by the United States over
regional affairs.
- The conservation of diplomatic capital for priorities
elsewhere in the world.
The costs could include:
- The steady deterioration of U.S. -Latin American
relations
.
- The loss of U.S. credibility, stature, and influence
among the developing countries of the region.
- A reversal of regional trends toward free trade.
- Alienation of the U.S. from key Latin American
countries
- The possible reversal of recent moves toward democracy
in the region.
Like ideal pan-Americanism, U.S. hegemony is not
likely to fulfill current U.S. policy expectations and does
not fit a world where power is being diffused and the United
States seems bound to pursue more cooperative policies.
5. Cooperative Multi-lateralism
Cooperative multi-lateralism could be viewed as the
application of the revised principles of the Good Neighbor
policy. Cooperative multi-lateralism implies a favorable
and productive U.S. -Latin American relationship and
consensus on issues of hemispheric concern.
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Adopting this policy would require trade-offs such as
the sharing of power and reliance on multi-lateral
initiatives to achieve U.S. regional policy goals. It
further implies primary reliance by the United States on
cooperative, inter-American security mechanisms to address
both traditional and non-traditional regional U.S. security
concerns. This includes mutually acceptable provisions for
enforcement action when necessary.
The benefits for the United States could include:
- Assistance from Latin America on U.S. security
interests including the problem of drug trafficking.
- A continued leadership role for the United States on
issues of mutual concern based on respect and
compromise, rather than U.S. dominance.
- Cooperation and progress on regional free trade.
- The empowerment of diplomatic solutions to resolve
regional problems.
- New avenues of influence to promote political
liberalization in Latin America.
- Generally healthy and vigorous relations with Latin
America
.
The costs might include:
- The sharing of regional power with other American
states
.
- Primary reliance on international law, diplomacy, and
consensus action to achieve U.S. regional objectives.
- A long-term commitment to pursue cooperative strategies
for achieving inter-American objectives.
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- An initial imbalance in economic benefits from free
trade that would probably favor Latin America until
balance is restored by economic growth.
The benefits appear to outweigh the risks especially
in an environment where traditional challenges to U.S.
security in the region have been all but eliminated. The
fact that traditional security threats have dissapated may
provide the extra time needed to pursue this option as long
as non-traditional threats like the drug problem do not
become vital to U.S. interests and derail these efforts.
Additionally, cooperative multi-lateralism is consistent
with the broad national interests of the United States as
stated in The National Security Strategy of the United
States.. 159 It represents the middle ground between the
negative realism of U.S. hegemony and the non-objective
idealism of pure pan-Americanism.
Cooperative multi-lateralism could be adopted as the
first step towards a more balanced hemispheric partnership,
a progression that would logically parallel the progress
towards stability and security in the world.
B. REGIONAL COOPERATION: A SHRINKING WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
In an effort to project U.S. strategies through the 1990s
and beyond, U.S. administration policy-makers assert that
159 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the
United States (August, 1991) .
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inter-dependence between nations will continue to grow.
They also believe cooperative efforts are the key to global
security and that U.S. policies should support these
efforts. 160 Towards this end, U.S. strategy for this "new
era" includes adherence to the following imperatives:
- "reinforcing the moral ties that hold our alliances
together, even as perceptions of a common security
threat change"
.
- "championing the principles of political and economic
freedom as the surest guarantors of human progress and
happiness, as well as global peace".
- "working with others in the global community to resolve
regional disputes and stem the proliferation of advanced
weapons"
.
- "reducing our defense burden as appropriate, while
restructuring our forces for new challenges".
- "addressing the new global agenda of refugee flows, drug
abuse, and environmental degradation." 161
In Latin America, cooperative strategies based on revised
Good Neighbor principles, as expressed through a policy of
cooperative multi-lateralism, seems to fill the prescription
outlined above. It also provides for both flexibility and
consistency as a policy foundation for pursuing U.S.






The strategy of containment won the Cold War, but the
cost in Latin America has been an intensified mistrust of
the United States that has only recently begun to erode.
Donald Papp characterizes perceptions as "guides to action"
in international affairs and states that perceptions "form
the bases of actions and policies". 162
Changing Latin America's perception of the United States
and establishing a relationship of mutual trust are critical
elements in achieving true regional cooperation. The
consistency with which the Good Neighbor policy was
implemented by FDR and his administration achieved this
objective in the turmoil of the 1930s and early 1940s. In
the uncertainties of the 1990s, the United States has a new
opportunity to accomplish the same objective.
162 Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations:
Frameworks for Understanding (New York, NY: MacMillan
Publishing Co., 1988), 154-6.
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APPENDIX A
LATIN AMERICAS SIGNIFICANCE TO THE UNITED STATES
The following background information is provided to
amplify the discussion of current U.S. -Latin American issues
in Chapter III.
A. DEMOGRAPHICS
Estimates and projections indicate that Latin America's
population by the year 2000 will be 527.3 million people,
approximately double that of the United States. 163 This
growth will continue to be accompanied by rapid
urbanization.
In I960, there were 10 cities with a population of more
than one million people in Latin America. That number grew
to 25 in 1980. By the turn of the century, 48 cities are
projected to have a population of one million or more and 10
of these will boast populations of more than five
million. 164
These numbers are significant for U.S. policy in terms of
163 The projected U.S. population is 267.9 million people.
Source: CELADE-BD, 35 (1985) as quoted from table 624 of
Statistical Abstract of Latin America , Vol.28 (1990): 122.
164 Source: Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 9.
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Latin America's potential for economic growth and the
potential for increased migration to the United States as
the result of economic and socio-political hardships.
B. LATIN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
As of 1990, more than 20 million persons of Hispanic-
American descent lived in the United States. 165 This was
the result of "massive and sustained" migration to the
United States, primarily from Mexico, Central America, and
the Caribbean. 166
Migration will likely continue and Latin American
immigrants will have an increasingly significant impact on
U.S. society. Their impact is already being felt in many
areas including education, employment, public health,
business, politics, and U.S. culture. 167 Latino voters in
California, Texas, and Florida are already affecting U.S.
policy in many areas. 168
165 Abraham Lowenthal, "Rediscovering America", Foreign





D. LATIN AMERICA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
Free market economics is replacing the protectionist
policies of the past in Latin America. This trend parallels
the ongoing democratization process in the region. Some
characteristics of this new economic environment include:
- The decreasing involvement of government through de-
regulation and the privatization of industry.
- New and generally favorable opportunities for foreign
investors
.
- Serious steps toward sub-regional economic integration
in anticipation of free trade opportunities with the
United States.
- The imposition of tough austerity and anti-
inflation policies in many countries including Mexico,
Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela. 169
These measures, combined with effective debt reduction
initiatives, could set the stage for good Latin American
economic performance well into the next century. 170 This
could prove to be very important to maintaining the United
States' economic competitiveness in the future. Table 7
provides a comparison of regional market sizes world-wide.
169 Sidney Weintraub, "Latin America's Economic Prospects
for the 1990s", CSIS Policy Papers on the Americas , Vol.1,







(Billion D. S. $) (Millions)
Western Hemisphere: 6,114 684
European Community: 4,720 365
East Asia: 2,048 323
171 Western Hemisphere includes the United States, Canada,
Mexico, Central American Common Market, Caribbean Community,
Andean Pact, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The
European Community includes the twelve members of the EC plus
East Germany. East Asia includes Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore,
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